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Arm-Wrestling in the Classroom:
The Non-Monotonic Effects of Monitoring Teachers
By Guilherme Lichand and Sharon Wolf∗
Teacher absenteeism and shirking are common problems in de-
veloping countries. While monitoring teachers should ameliorate
those problems, mobilizing parents to do so often leads to small or
even negative effects on learning outcomes. This paper provides
causal evidence that this might result from non-monotonic effects
of monitoring teachers. Cross-randomizing nudges to teachers and
parents in Ivory Coast – to motivate and monitor teachers directly,
and to mobilize parents –, we find that, in schools where parents
are nudged, numeracy and literacy test scores improve by an addi-
tional school quarter, and student dropouts decrease by over 50%.
In contrast, in schools where both are nudged, there is no effect
on either learning outcomes or dropouts – even though the lat-
ter also fall by nearly 50% where teachers are nudged alone. In
those schools, teachers show up less frequently, allocate less time
to career development, and target instruction to top students to a
greater extent than in schools where only parents are nudged. Mon-
itoring backfires precisely for teachers who were most motivated at
baseline, consistent with monitoring intensity eventually crowding
out intrinsic motivation. Our results have implications for the de-
sign of accountability programs above and beyond education.
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A famous cartoon portrays parents’ reactions when their child comes home with
an ‘F’ grade, in the 1960’s and in the 2000’s: parents from the past confront their
child about her poor grade; in contrast, parents from the present side with the
child to confront the teacher instead.1,2 While teacher accountability might have
indeed changed over time, the cartoon hints at a more fundamental question: is
monitoring teachers good or bad for children’s education? This paper investigates
the effects of monitoring teachers through different strategies, providing first-hand
causal evidence that the answer to that question might depend on monitoring
intensity.
Teacher effectiveness is a key hurdle to human capital formation in developing
countries. Across seven Sub-Saharan African countries, Bold et al. (2017) docu-
ments that not only do many teachers lack minimum knowledge in language and
mathematics, they are also very often absent from the classroom (on average, 44%
of the time). Even when teachers are with students, they often spend little time
on task; in an audit study in India, 21% of teachers were found just ‘minding the
classroom’ instead of actually teaching (Abadzi, 2007). And even when teachers
actually teach, they tend to target instruction to the top students, leaving those
who struggle behind (Duflo, Duplas and Kremer, 2011).
Widespread absenteeism and shirking by teachers in low-income countries have
been dubbed a ‘motivation crisis’ (Moon, 2007). Linking under-provision of effort
by teachers to their lack of intrinsic motivation reflects a moral hazard problem
between parents and teachers. Parents delegate the provision of costly inputs
to their children’s education, but cannot perfectly observe the extent to which
teachers put effort into it. Since teachers are typically not paid by performance,
this leads incentives to be misaligned: teachers are often not motivated enough
(intrinsically or extrinsically) to exert the same level of effort that parents would
have optimally set.
In face of that problem, having parents monitor teachers more closely should
increase effort and improve learning outcomes. Having said that, evidence from
lab experiments suggests that monitoring might actually crowd out intrinsic mo-
tivation and effort (Fehr and Gächter, 2000), e.g. if agents perceive it as an indi-
cation of distrust (Frey, 1993). Is it also the case outside the lab, when it comes
to monitoring teachers? If so, which effect dominates? Does too much monitoring
backfire, with parents and teachers ‘arm-wrestling’ over children’s education?
We study these questions in the context of Ivory Coast, a West-African coun-
try where about half of 6th-graders are considered not competent in reading and
nearly 2/3 are not competent in Math (World Bank, 2018). We cross-randomize
nudges to teachers and caregivers across 296 classrooms (2nd, 4th and 6th grades)
in 100 public schools.3 Nudges to teachers aim at increasing their effort directly,
1https://www.pinterest.com/pin/108649409733682544/, accessed on January 28, 2021.
2Changes in parenting styles over the last decades, in response to several economic and societal
changes, might actually have led parents to monitor both students and teachers to a greater extent; see
Doepke and Zilibotti (2017).
3For many public school students in developing countries, primary caregivers are not the parents but,
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encouraging attendance and time-on-task, and monitoring them about compli-
ance with suggested activities. Because the program was run in partnership with
the Ministry of Education, it carried an official weight. Nudges to parents aim at
increasing their engagement in their children’s education, including showing up
in school to monitor teachers. Both teachers and parents receive nudges twice a
week through text messages (SMS) over the course of the whole school year.4 Our
experimental design has several advantages. Nudging teachers and parents inde-
pendently allows us to estimate the causal effects of monitoring teachers through
different strategies – directly, or through community monitoring – on teachers’
effort and educational outcomes. In turn, nudging teachers and parents concur-
rently allows us to estimate the causal effects of higher-intensity monitoring.
While nudges to parents indeed affect the extent to which they monitor teachers,
they do not affect other dimensions of parental engagement. In schools where
parents are nudged, 24% of teachers report that the typical parent shows up at
least once a week, compared to only 13% in control schools. Where parents are
nudged, students also report a higher likelihood that their parents show up in
school to talk to teachers or participate in meetings, relative to control schools,
but no systematic differences when it comes to the extent to which parents help
students with academic activities, talk to them about school, motivate them to
study harder, or resort to corporal punishment. This allows us to interpret the
effects of nudges to parents exclusively as those of monitoring teachers indirectly.
Results are as follows. Starting with administrative data on student achieve-
ment – only available for school dropouts and grade repetition, aggregated at the
classroom level –, we find that only nudges to parents systematically improve ed-
ucational prospects. Effects are driven by student dropouts. We find that nudges
to parents decrease dropouts across all grades by 2.48 p.p. – a 53% reduction rel-
ative to control schools. In contrast, in schools where both parents and teachers
are nudged, there is no impact on dropouts relative to the control group.5 This
is the case even though dropouts also fall by nearly 50% in schools where only
teachers are nudged.
Why do nudges dramatically improve the prospects that children remain in
school when parents are nudged, but not when the intervention targets both par-
ents and teachers? We start by analyzing treatment effects on teacher effort.
Nudging only parents increases teacher attendance, significantly so among those
who had below-median attendance at baseline – for whom the intervention de-
creases absenteeism by nearly 25%. In turn, nudging both parents and teachers
actually increases teacher absenteeism relative to control schools. The effect is
driven by low-attendance teachers, precisely those with more wiggle room to react
rather, close relatives (e.g. grandparents). In this paper, we use parents and caregivers interchangeably
for ease of exposition.
4We also randomized whether parents received Eduq+ over SMS or automated phone calls (Interactive
Voice Response units, IVR).
5This is not a matter of precision; the effect size of nudging both parents and teachers on student
dropouts is only -0.31 p.p.
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to higher-intensity monitoring – and, in fact, those whose attendance increases
the most when only parents are nudged. Teachers’ time use and the extent to
which they ‘teach to the top’ also respond to the interventions in similar ways. In
schools where both parents and teachers are nudged, teachers dedicate less time
to career development than in those where only parents are nudged. Analyzing
the set of students whom we are unable to track at end line (which we use as a
proxy for school dropouts at the student level), the share of low-achievers who
drop out in those schools is significantly higher than where only teachers are
nudged – consistent with too intense monitoring inducing teachers to focus on
struggling students to a lesser extent.
Next, how do parents and students respond to changes in teacher effort? Using
survey data, we find that nudges make parents more pessimistic about students’
grades relative to those in control schools, just as in Bettinger et al. (2020), where
nudges bring over-optimistic parents’ beliefs closer to the ground truth.6,7 Having
said that, their effect size is much larger where teachers are nudged concurrently,
consistent with parents becoming too pessimistic about their children’s school
standing in those schools. In effect, where both teachers and parents are nudged,
the latter are less likely to say they have engaged in dialogue or incentives as means
to discipline children, relative to where only parents are nudged.8 As such, while
student effort increases similarly across treatment conditions, they only learn
significantly more than control students in schools where only parents are nudged:
students’ numeracy and literacy tests scores leap by about 1 school quarter ahead
in those schools, but experience no improvement where both parents and teachers
are nudged.
Strikingly, nudging both parents and teachers backfires for the most intrinsi-
cally motivated teachers. Among those with above-median baseline motivation,
nudges to both parents and teachers decreases their attendance and increases
student dropouts.9 In contrast, among those with below-median motivation at
baseline, nudging both teachers and parents neither decreases teacher attendance
nor increases student dropouts. These patterns are consistent with too intense
monitoring crowding out teachers’ intrinsic motivation.
Is non-monotonicity an artifact of intervening on both parents and teachers
concurrently? In particular, sending text messages to both could trigger backlash
because it violates social norms about the division of labor (Görges and Nosenzo,
2020). We rule out that concern in three ways. First, we take advantage of an
additional experiment embedded in our research design, which randomized some
6We match observations based on their baseline characteristics to account for selective attrition
induced by the interventions; see Section II.C.
7Different from Bettinger et al. (2020), Bergman (2021) and Dizon-Ross (2019), we cannot assess
the extent to which parents are more or less accurate about their children’s school performance because
there is no administrative data on grades in Ivory Coast.
8Findings are consistent with parents in those schools either communicating less with their children
or resorting to physical or psychological violence to a greater extent; see Section IV.B.
9That is the case even though nudging only parents or only teachers increases teacher attendance
and decreases student dropouts in that case.
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parents to nudges via text messages and others to nudges via audio messages
– holding fixed everything else about the intervention, such as its content and
the frequency of messaging. Consistent with parents seeking teachers’ help to
understand text messages from the school (as 41% of parents in our sample never
attended school), we document that teachers systematically know when parents
are nudged via SMS, but not when they are nudged via audio.10 We show that
nudging both teachers and parents indeed backfires to a greater extent when the
latter receive text messages; having said that, nudges to both also backfire even
when teachers do not know that parents are nudged: in schools where teachers
are nudged and parents receive audio messages, teacher attendance also decreases,
and student dropouts decrease to a much lesser extent – less than 1/4 the effect
size of nudges in schools where only parents are nudged.
The second way we document that our results are not an artifact of our ex-
perimental design is by estimating how student test scores react to the share of
parents who frequently show up in school (reported by students) across different
treatment cells. In control schools, the higher the share of parents who monitor
teachers, the higher are numeracy and literacy test scores. In contrast, in schools
where only teachers are nudged, test scores increase, at first, with the share of
parents who show up in school, but eventually stall, decreasing as that share
exceeds 75% – even though no parent is nudged in those schools.
The third way we show that non-monotonicity is a general property of how
teachers respond to monitoring intensity is by eliciting teachers’ best-response
function: their optimal effort level as a function of parents’ monitoring levels. To
do so, we survey teachers about their planned effort in the classroom in response
to community monitoring, varying the frequency at which parents show up in
school as well as the share of parents who monitor at that level. We find that
teachers’ planned effort at first increases with community monitoring but, in fact,
decreases when too many parents show up too often in school, consistent with the
‘arm-wrestling’ mechanism underscored by our experimental results.
Our non-monotonicity finding helps reconcile seemingly inconsistent results in
the literature on parent-teacher moral hazard. On the one hand, Kremer and
Holla (2009) enumerates successful monitoring interventions that mitigate the
effects of informational asymmetries between parents and teachers, particularly
when able to provide conditional incentives (e.g. Duflo, Hanna and Ryan, 2012).
On the other hand, Banerjee et al. (2010) finds that participatory programs to
monitor teachers have no effect on teacher’s effort or students’ test scores, Gertler,
Patrinos and Rubio-Codina (2012) finds that mobilizing parents fails to decrease
grade repetition in extremely poor communities, and Wolf et al. (2019) finds
that while a teacher training intervention in Ghana has large positive effects on
literacy among preschool children, the positive learning effects disappear when
10Audio messages are delivered through automated calls (IVR), and cannot be played again once the
call is over. We document that, when only parents are nudged, treatment effects do not systematically
vary by text or audio.
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parents are assigned to parent-teacher association meetings to inform them of
the new teaching practices and encourage them to engage with the teacher. Our
results suggest that non-monotonic effects of monitoring likely explain why some
programs work, but not others – especially when community monitoring happens
in combination with programs targeting teachers (which might also be perceived
as monitoring), and in regions where teachers are likely to be positively selected
on intrinsic motivation (such as extremely poor communities).
Our results also contribute to a large literature on the economics of educa-
tion that discusses how parents’ and teachers’ inputs matter for children’s human
capital production (Glewwe and Kremer, 2006). Observational data have been
extensively used to back up claims about how those inputs interact, sometimes
in favor of complementarity (e.g. Fryer Jr, Devi and Holden, 2016; World Bank,
2018; Agostinelli, Saharkhiz and Wiswall, 2019), and sometimes in favor or sub-
stitutability (Greaves et al., 2019; Chang, Cobb-Clark and Salamanca, 2020).11
This is the first paper to show that teachers’ best-response function is actually
non-monotonic with respect to parents’ effort, making educational inputs behave
like complements or substitutes over different ranges of the support distribution.
Beyond education, our empirical findings showcase that promoting accountabil-
ity can crowd out intrinsic motivation even in the absence of financial incentives,
and decrease effort above and beyond merely displacing it to other margins that
are not monitored to the same extent.12,13 While lab experiments document that
monitoring above a certain threshold can decrease work effort (e.g. Falk and Kos-
feld, 2006; Dickinson and Villeval, 2008), to our knowledge, this is the first paper
to provide rigorous evidence for that phenomenon in the field.
I. Background
This section describes the Ivorian educational setting in subsection I.A, followed
by details about our interventions in subsection I.B.
A. Education in Ivory Coast
Education in Ivory Coast is pervasively low-quality: Ivorian students’ literacy
and numeracy skills are rated among the poorest in West Africa (World Bank,
2018). Out of the nearly 8 million Ivorian school children, most have to rely
11Related (quasi-)experimental studies are Das et al. (2013), which shows substitution between spend-
ing by parents and schools, and Fryer Jr, Devi and Holden (2016), which shows substitution across
different academic subjects.
12Among accountability programs that successfully induced higher effort and improved downstream
outcomes, see e.g. Gaduh et al. (2020); Duflo, Hanna and Ryan (2012); Björkman and Svensson (2009)
in education, Christensen et al. (forthcoming); Nyqvist, de Walque and Svensson (2017) in health, and
Olken (2007) in infrastructure.
13Among accountability programs that failed to induce higher effort or improve downstream outcomes,
see e.g. Barrera et al. (2020); Raffler, Posner and Parkerson (2019); Wolf et al. (2019); Gertler, Patrinos
and Rubio-Codina (2012); Banerjee et al. (2010). In particular, on how monitoring might displace effort
to other margins, see e.g. Lichand and Fernandes (2019); Rasul and Rogger (2018); Gerardino, Litschig
and Pomeranz (2017); Shi (2008); Yang (2008).
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on public schools for their primary education, especially outside of Abidjan (its
main economic center). In those schools, children are taught by professionals who
often have very limited training and precarious knowledge about the subjects they
teach (Bold et al., 2017). What is worse, it is often the case that teachers say
there is little they can do if parents do not have the necessary education (World
Bank, 2018). Since educational achievement in the country is very low, this
hints at a potential vicious cycle, whereby neither parents nor teachers contribute
significantly to producing children’s education. While in our sample less than 20%
of teachers concur with that statement, over 25% of parents do. What is more,
30-40% of both teachers and parents agree that there is little teachers can do
if parents have too many personal or financial problems – which are of course
widespread in the poor setting where the study takes place.
Primary education is organized in three cycles: CP (grades 1 and 2), CE (grades
3 and 4) and CM (grades 5 and 6). Children are assessed at the end of each cycle
(CP2, CE2 and CM2). Because we are interested in school progression, our study
focuses on those final years of each cycle, comprising 2nd, 4th and 6th graders.
In our sample, the typical number of students is 49 per classroom at CP2, 46
at CE2 and 40 at CM2. Primary completion rates are low (73.3%), with the
majority of children dropping out before completing the three primary cycles.14
In our sample, average grade repetition rates across all primary grades are over
15%, and yearly dropout rates average 4.7%.
Our study takes place in the cocoa producing regions of Aboisso and Bouafle.
Besides the usual challenges of developing country settings, along with Ghana,
Ivory Coast hosts approximately 2/3 of the world production of cocoa. This has
been linked to one of the highest incidences of child labor worldwide, with almost 2
million children employed in cocoa fields.15 In our sample, nearly 45% of children
report to actively help with farm labor. What is more, corporal punishment is
quite widespread in this setting as a disciplining strategy, raising additional chal-
lenges to children’s human capital formation in face of the correlational evidence
about its negative effects on socio-emotional development (Wolf and Suntheimer,
2020b).16
B. Nudges to parents and teachers
The educational program we offer parents in the context of our experiment
(Eduq+, powered by the Brazilian EdTech Movva) delivers nudges directly to par-
ents’ and teachers’ mobile phones.17 Nudges are organized in thematic sequences
– comprised of four messages –, with two messages delivered each week. Inspired
14https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.PRSL.ZS?locations=CI.
15https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15681986.
16In a companion paper, we study the experiment to study the extent to which child labor and
education are really substitutes in this setting (Wolf and Lichand, 2020).
17Movva (http://movva.tech) delivers nudges to engage parents in their children’s education across
Brazil and Ivory Coast, as of January 2021. One of the authors (Guilherme) is Movva’s co-founder and
chairman.
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by READY4K! (York, Loeb and Doss, 2019), sequences start with a motivating
fact, followed by a suggested activity; users then receive an interactive message
in the following week, posing them a question linked to the activity suggested the
week before; last, a “growth” message meant to highlight that engaging in activi-
ties such as those should be routine concludes the sequence. Content is catered to
students’ age group. The intervention was implemented over the entire 2018-19
school year. In the context of our study, nudges to teachers aim at increasing
their attendance and time-on-task while teaching. Messages suggest pedagogical
strategies, encourage teachers to show up to school everyday and discourage cor-
poral punishment. Every other week, an interactive message monitors whether
teachers are complying with suggested activities. Because the program was ran
in partnership with the Ministry of Education, it carried an official weight.
Nudges to parents aim at boosting parental engagement. Messages suggest non-
curricular activities to do with children, and encourage parents to take an interest
in their children’s school life. Some messages explicitly encourage caregivers to
show up to parent-teacher meetings. Because parents in developing countries
often delegate their children’s education to the school (e.g. Wolf, 2020), nudges
did not systematically induce parents to engage in their children’s school life other
than monitoring teachers more frequently: in Section III, we show that, in schools
where parents are nudged, both teachers and students report that parents show up
in school and attend parent-teacher meetings to a greater extent that in control
schools, but find no other systematic differences in the extent to which they
help children in academic activities, incentivize them to study harder, engage in
dialogue about school, or resort to corporal punishment as a disciplining strategy.
As Section II explains, we randomize treated parents to either nudges via text
messages (SMS) or audio messages – delivered through automated phone calls (In-
teractive Voice Response units; IVR). Other than the delivery mode, the content
and the frequency of the nudges is identical across the two groups.
II. Empirical strategy
This section discusses our empirical strategy. Subsection II.A introduces our
experiment design, followed by a summary of the outcomes we draw upon in
subsection II.B. Last, subsection II.C describes the equations we estimate, our
treatment of standard errors and selective attrition, and how we deal with multiple
comparisons.
A. Experiment design
All details of the experimental design and a pre-analysis plan were pre-registered
at the AEA RCT Registry on October 31, 2018 (AEARCTR-0003385). Appendix
H presents the pre-analysis plan in full.
We cross-randomize nudges to teachers and parents across 296 classrooms (2nd,
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4th and 6th grades) in 100 Ivorian public schools.18 Randomization was under-
taken at the school-level, to optimize capacity-building of school staff for enrolling
parents into the nudge program. Out of the 100 schools, 25 were randomly as-
signed to receive no intervention (the control group); 25 were assigned to have
only teachers nudged; 24 were assigned to have only parents nudged; and 26 were
assigned to have both teachers and parents receive nudges.19 Within the group of
schools assigned to nudges to parents (concurrently or not with nudges to teach-
ers), half were assigned to have parents receive nudges via text messages, and the






25 schools 12 schools 12 schools
Nudges to 74 classrooms 35 classrooms 35 classrooms
Teachers
Yes
25 schools 13 schools 13 schools
74 classrooms 39 classrooms 39 classrooms
At each school, enrollment was voluntary: teachers and parents merely had to
provide their phone numbers to receive nudges at no cost. Because the inter-
ventions are undertaken in partnership with the Ministry of Education, all CP2,
CE2 and CM2 teachers in sampled schools consented to participate. All primary
caregivers with phones were also enrolled, either directly, in school meetings to
sensitize them about the nudge program, or indirectly, via the school principal.
In both cases, they could opt-out of the program at any point, at no cost, via
SMS.
Appendix A shows that the different treatment arms are balanced: there are no
significant differences in baseline characteristics of students, teachers or schools
across cells.
B. Data and outcomes
The first set of outcomes we have access to is administrative data on student
dropouts and grade repetition, shared by school districts upon request of the
Ministry of Education. These variables were only made available at the classroom
level; concretely, we were informed about how many students started the year
in CP2, CM2 and CE2 classrooms, how many finished the year in school, and
how many progressed to the next cycle. We compute grade repetition from the
difference between those who finished the school year enrolled and those who
progressed to the next school cycle in each classroom, and compute dropouts
184 schools in our sample only covered the first two cycles of primary education.
19Numbers are uneven because local partners were particularly interested in the arm at which both
parties were nudged.
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from the difference between the number of students who started and those who
finished the year in each classroom.
Because some students transfer across schools throughout the year, this measure
of dropouts is not perfect; in particular, it is negative for 9 out of 296 classrooms,
where more students were enrolled by the end of the school year than when it
started.20 For this reason, we also rely on a proxy for school dropouts at the
student level: we define proxy dropouts equal to 1 if we cannot track a student
between our baseline and end-line surveys, and 0 otherwise. 9.4% of students
surveyed at baseline could not be tracked at our end-line survey. Since we are
unable to track students for a variety of reasons other than dropouts, this is
larger than the incidence of student dropouts in the administrative data (4.7%);
nevertheless, the latter is highly correlated with our survey proxy, averaged at the
classroom level (the slope coefficient is 0.98, with adjusted R2=0.23; see Figure
B1).21 We use this proxy to validate our classroom-level estimates (see Appendix
B), and to investigate the extent to which the interventions induce teachers to
target instruction to top students – estimating whether the characteristics of those
whom we cannot track at end line vary systematically across treatment cells (see
Section IV.B).
The second set of outcomes we have access to is survey data. Baseline data
collection took place at the beginning of the school year, in October/2018, and
end-line data collection, at the end of it, in June/2019. We elicited school charac-
teristics, measures of teacher attendance and parental engagement (both reported
by students), teachers’ self-reported motivation and career investments, the ex-
tent to which parents show up in school (as reported by students and teachers),
parental beliefs about their children’s school performance (captured by their best
guess of their child’s math and French grades), parents’ disciplining strategies
(reported by students and parents), student self-reported effort, and standard-
ized numeracy and literacy test scores.22 For test scores, we adapted PASEC’s
and IDELA’s items, after extensive piloting to prevent floor effects.23 Within
each school, we randomly drew 13 CP2 students and 12 CE2 students to be sur-
20Appendix F shows that results are robust to imputing dropout rates as zero for those classrooms
where our computations yield negative dropouts.
21We did not ask parents whether their children had abandoned school or stayed in the same cycle
at the end-line survey because, at that point, school official decisions on grade promotion had not yet
been released. We did try to collect teacher recall data on student-level grade repetition and dropouts
in an additional follow-up survey after the new school year had already started. Those outcomes are not
analyzed in the paper because, as nudges to teachers affect teacher attendance and instruction targeting
(see Section IV.B), the interventions likely induce differential recall across treatment cells.
22In companion papers, we characterize the main predictors of learning outcomes in Ivory Coast,
including additional outcomes not shown in this paper, such as children’s socio-emotional skills (Wolf,
Lichand and Deambrosi, 2020) and executive functions Finch, Wolf and Lichand (2020). We also docu-
ment treatment effects on child labor, showcasing that the child labor and education are not necessarily
substitutes Wolf and Lichand (2020).
23For details on the Programme for the Analysis of Education Systems (PASEC); see
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/education/publication/the-programme-for-the-analysis-of-
education-systems-2014. For details on International Development and Early Learning Assessment
(IDELA), see Pisani, Borisova and Dowd (2018).
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veyed at each wave. As such, our sample comprises 200 teachers, and 1,285 CP2
students and 1,190 CE2 students surveyed at baseline along with their primary
caregivers. We are able to track all teachers, 1,157 CP2 students (90.0%) and
1,086 CE2 students (91.3%) at end line. We assigned replacement households in
case the ones drawn could not be tracked by enumerators.
Tables A1 and A2 compile summary statistics of schools’, students’, parents’
and teachers’ baseline characteristics. Schools have on average 258 students en-
rolled across all primary cycles, featuring an average of 6 teachers – each solely
responsible for one of the grades within a primary cycle. 58% of primary care-
givers in our sample are male; as discussed, 41% never attended school. 53% of
students in our sample are boys. The average teacher is 41 years old and has
worked as a teacher for almost 15 years, approximately half of this experience ac-
quired at the current school. Appendix A documents that baseline characteristics
of schools, teachers, parents and students are balanced across treatment arms.
Figure 1 displays the correlation between variation in teacher attendance be-
tween baseline and end line (reported by students at each point in time) and
variation in numeracy test scores (Panel A) and literacy test scores (Panel B).
While average student performance increases over time for most of the classrooms,
numeracy and literacy test scores tend to increase proportionally to increases in
teacher attendance. Such correlations are consistent with the idea that teacher
effort is a key constraint to human capital production in this setting.
The third set of outcomes we have access to is data from an additional follow-
up survey we undertook at the beginning of the following school year, in Octo-
ber/2019. We elicited teachers’ future career plans, teacher perceived monitoring
intensity (captured by their recall of how frequently the typical caregiver in her
classroom showed up in school over the previous school year), and parents’ and
teachers’ best-response functions with respect to the other party’s effort levels.
We tried to revisit all 200 CP2 and CE2 teachers interviewed in previous waves,
and to survey the 96 CM2 teachers for the first time. We successfully surveyed
273 of those (92.2%).24 We also re-surveyed 1 caregiver per classroom (randomly
drawn, given budget constraints), across all 296 classrooms in our sample.25
C. Estimation
Throughout the paper, we estimate average treatment effects (ATE) using OLS
regressions based on treatment assignment. Because of issues such as phone shar-
ing and network availability, not all subjects received nudges as assigned. Ap-
pendix C estimates treatment effects on the treated (ATT), whereby treatment
assignment is used as an instrument for whether parents or teachers in the treat-
24Out of the 23 teachers whom we were unable to survey in this additional follow-up, 1 refused to
participate. The others were either on professional training activities in Abidjan, on sick leave, retired
or had been transferred to another region.
25We again assigned replacement households in case the ones drawn could not be tracked by enumer-
ators.
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Figure 1. Variation in teacher attendance and std. test scores between baseline
and end line
Panel A: Numeracy test scores
Panel B: Literacy test scores
Note: Bin-scatter plots of the variation in students’ std. numeracy test scores (Panel A) and literacy
test score (Panel B) between baseline and end line as a function of the variation in teacher attendance
between baseline and end line. Teacher attendance stands for the share of days on which teachers were
in the classroom over the 2 weeks prior to the survey, according to students. Test scores and teacher
attendance are averaged at the classroom level.
12 MONTH YEAR
ment groups acknowledge, at the end-line survey, receiving text messages from
the school over the course of the school year.
For administrative outcomes (only available at classroom level), we estimate
the following equation:
Ysc = α+ β1Parentss + β2Teacherss + β3Boths + θc + εsc,(1)
where Ysc stands for the dropout rate or grade repetition rate in classroom c at
school s; Parentss = 1 if school s was assigned to have only parents nudged, and
0 otherwise; Teacherss = 1 if school s was assigned to have only teachers nudged,
and 0 otherwise; Boths = 1 if school s was assigned to have both teachers and
parents nudged, and 0 otherwise; θc stands for grade fixed-effects; and εsc is an
error term. We are interested in testing β1 ≤ 0, β2 ≤ 0 and β3 ≥ β1.
To deal with family-wise error rates from multiple hypotheses testing, we com-
bine student dropouts and grade repetition into a summary measure, following
Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007).
For survey outcomes, we estimate an ANCOVA specification, as follows:





where Ysci,t stands for the survey outcome (e.g. standardized test scores) for sub-
ject i in classroom c at school s, measured at wave t; and Xsci,0 is a vector of
individual baseline characteristics. For positive outcomes, such as teacher atten-
dance, parental engagement or student test scores, we are interested in testing
β1 ≥ 0, β2 ≥ 0 and β3 ≤ β1 (and the opposite for negative outcomes, such as
corporal punishment).
We cluster standard errors at the classroom level, allowing outcomes to be ar-
bitrarily correlated among students (and their parents) under the same teacher.
Even though the intervention was randomized at the school level, this makes sense
as no teacher in our sample is responsible for more than one classroom, and as
nudges are meant to mobilize parents to monitor their children’s teacher – not
those of other grades.26 Moreover, evidence from social contact patterns within
schools in Sub-Saharan Africa suggests that students interact mostly within class-
room, particularly at young age (Stehlé et al., 2011).
For survey outcomes with multiple measurements (e.g. we ask multiple ques-
tions about parental engagement and disciplining strategies), we again combine
different components into summary measures, following Kling, Liebman and Katz
(2007). We analyze treatment effects on specific combinations of outcomes as
specified in our pre-analysis plan.
26Appendix F shows that clustering standard errors at the school level leads to only slightly less
precisely estimated coefficients.
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Since our interventions affect student dropouts (Section IV), treatment assign-
ment influenced our ability to track students at end line relative to the control
group. To deal with selective attrition, we predict the probability of successfully
tracking respondents at the end-line survey – from a logistic regression based
on baseline characteristics in the control group – and control flexibly for this
propensity score in all regressions involving survey outcomes.27,28 This match-
ing procedure ensures that our estimates capture causal treatment effects (rather
than compositional changes across treatment cells) under the assumption that
selection is independent of potential outcomes once conditioning on observable
baseline characteristics. We do not adjust standard errors to account for gen-
erated regressors because we restrict attention to average treatment effects (see
Abadie and Imbens, 2016).
III. Perceived monitoring intensity
We start by documenting that parents and teachers indeed pay attention to
the nudges, and, most importantly, that nudges to parents induce teachers to
experience higher monitoring intensity, captured by their perceptions of the extent
to which parents show up in school over the course of the experiment.
Table 1 estimates treatment effects on whether parents (columns 1-3) and teach-
ers (columns 4-6) recall receiving messages from the school, breaking down the
sample into schools where parents were nudged via text messages (column 2 and
5) and those where parents were nudged via audio messages (columns 3 and 6)
to test whether parents’ and teachers’ recall depends on delivery mode. Last,
column (7) estimates treatment effects on whether teachers report that the care-
giver of the typical child in her classroom showed up in school at least once a
week throughout the year.
The table shows that 52.2% of parents nudged independently, and 48.3% of
those nudged concurrently with teachers, recall receiving messages from the school
over the course of the experiment. While those figures should be 100% under per-
fect compliance with treatment assignment, several factors – from phone network
availability issues in rural areas to phone sharing and frequent changes in SIM
cards among low-income users – could explain why they fall substantially short of
it. In any case, these figures are much higher than in control schools, where only
18% of parents recalls receiving messages from the school over the course of the
experiment; in both cases, differences are statistically significant at the 1% level.
Reassuringly, parents are no more likely to recall receiving messages if teachers
were nudged, but not them.
27Appendix D compiles the details of the matching procedure, and shows that results are robust to
matching observations based on their baseline characteristics through a non-parametric, nearest-neighbor
algorithm.
28In the case of CM2 teachers, whom we only survey in the additional follow-up wave, selective non-
response cannot me remedied through matching because we have no data on their baseline characteristics.
For this reason, whenever using follow-up data from teacher surveys, we bound treatment effects following
Lee (2009); see Appendix E.
14 MONTH YEAR
Just like parents, teachers pay attention to the nudges: while 24.5% recall
messages from the school in the control group, 82.9% of them do so when they are
nudged (significant at the 1% level; column 4). Different from parents, teachers
recall messages from the school even when the other party is nudged. Columns
(5) and (6) show that this is driven by text messages: when parents are nudged
via audio messages, teachers are no more likely to recall receiving messages than
those in control schools (column 6); in contrast, when parents are nudged via
SMS, teacher recall raises from 24% to 67% (a difference significant at the 1%
level; column 5). In turn, parents’ recall of messages from the school when they
are nudged independently is statistically identical across text messages (52.2%;
column 2) and audio messages (51.6%; column 3). Such interesting pattern in
differential recall is consistent with parents seeking teachers’ help for interpreting
nudges via text messages, but not audio.29
Another insightful finding is that, when nudges are delivered via audio, parents’
recall is just the same when they are nudged alone or concurrently with teachers
(column 3); in contrast, recall is much lower in the latter case when nudges are
delivered via SMS (from 52.2% to 41%, a significant difference at the 5% level;
column 2). This is consistent with teachers being substantially less willing to help
parents read and understand text messages when they are also nudged.
Last, while only 12.7% of teachers in control schools state in the additional
follow-up survey that the typical parent in her classroom showed up in school at
least once a week over the course of our experiment, that figure was 23.9% in
schools where parents are nudged, and 25% where both teachers and parents are
nudged (significant at the 10% level; column 7).30 Consistent with the idea that
nudges to both lead to perceptions of higher-intensity monitoring, teacher recall
rates are even higher when they are nudged concurrently with parents (92.2%
when via SMS, and 87.5% via audio; columns 3 and 4).
All in all, teacher recall and perceived monitoring patterns showcase that nudges
led parents to show up in school to a greater extent, as intended, and that this
affected teachers’ perceived monitoring intensity – to a greater extent when both
parents and teachers were nudged concurrently.
29We leverage this difference in Section V.B to estimate whether higher-intensity monitoring backfires
even when teachers are not aware that parents are nudged.
30Appendix E shows that these results are not sensitive to selective non-response at the additional
follow-up survey.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IV. Impacts of monitoring teachers
This section documents treatment effects on educational outcomes. We start
by investigating the impacts of the monitoring interventions on administrative
outcomes, in subsection IV.A. Next, subsection IV.B analyzes treatment effects
on several dimensions of teacher effort, followed by their effects on parental en-
gagement, student effort and learning, in subsection IV.C. Last, subsection IV.D
discusses heterogeneous treatment effects by grade and gender.
A. Effects on school dropouts and grade repetition
We estimate the effects of nudges to parents and teachers on classroom-level
measures of school progression. To avoid the issue of multiple comparisons, we
compute a summary measure (following Kling, Liebman and Katz, 2007), aver-
aging across dropout rates and grade repetition rates, each standardized with re-
spect to the mean and standard deviation of the control group. In effect, dropouts
and grade repetition are often treated as interconnected phenomena in develop-
ing countries’ primary education, especially at young ages: children who abandon
school are often those who are not progressing at the right pace (Kabay, 2016;
Brophy, 2006). Table 2 presents the results in column (1), as well as treatment
effects on each of its components in columns (2) and (3).
The table shows that nudges to parents systematically impact school progres-
sion: the summary measure of dropouts and grade repetition falls by 0.24 standard
deviation when parents are nudged, relative to the control group (significant at
the 5% level; column 1). Strikingly, nudging both parents and teachers has no
effect on school progression: its effect size is nearly 1/6 that of nudging parents
alone. Columns (2) and (3) highlight that effects are driven by student dropouts.
In schools where only parents are nudged, dropouts decrease by 2.48 p.p. – a huge
effect size, over 50% the average dropout rate in the control group (significant at
the 1% level). In schools where only teachers are nudged, dropouts also decrease
(by 2.23 p.p., significant at the 5% level). In contrast, nudging both teachers
and parents has a tiny and statistically insignificant effect size (-0.31 p.p., less
than 7% the control group average). The coefficient of the joint intervention is
statistically different from those of nudging either parents (p = 0.02) or teachers
(p = 0.04) independently.
Appendix B shows that the very same patterns hold for our student-level
proxy of dropouts, although less precisely estimated: nudges to parents cut proxy
dropouts nearly in half relative to the control group (from 12% to 8%, significant
at the 10% level), while the effect size of nudges to both parents and teachers
is almost 20% lower and no longer statistically insignificant. As the Appendix
also shows, part of the imprecision comes from the fact that treatment effects are
concentrated on intrinsically motivated teachers; among those with above-median
motivation at baseline, nudging both parents and teachers backfires in strikingly
similar ways across the administrative and proxy measures (see Section V.A).
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Table 2—Treatment effects on student dropout and grade repetition
Components
Summary Dropout Grade rep.
measure rate rate
(1) (2) (3)
Parents -0.2393** -0.0248*** -0.0107
(0.1093) (0.0095) (0.0206)
Teachers -0.1225 -0.0223** 0.0148
(0.1078) (0.0094) (0.0203)
Both -0.0428 -0.0031 -0.0047
(0.1064) (0.0092) (0.0201)
Control group mean 0.0000 0.0468 0.1527
Parents = Both [p-value] 0.0698 0.0212 0.7682
Teachers = Both [p-value] 0.4546 0.0384 0.3331
Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 296 296 296
R-squared 0.0353 0.0462 0.0151
Note: Parents = 1 in schools where only parents are nudged, and 0 otherwise; Teachers = 1 in schools
where only teachers are nudged, and 0 otherwise; and Both = 1 in schools where both parents and teachers
are nudged, and 0 otherwise. Data are from administrative records. In column (1), following Kling,
Liebman and Katz (2007), the summary measure averages across index components, each normalized
by control group mean and standard deviation; in columns (2) and (3), index components are dropout
rate (col. 2) and grade repetition rate (col. 3) at the classroom level. Standard errors in parentheses. *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
18 MONTH YEAR
Last, Appendix C estimates average treatment effects on the treated (ATT),
using treatment assignment as an instrument for whether treated parents and
teachers recall receiving messages from the school. Impacts on proxy dropouts
are larger and very precisely estimated in that case: the effect size of nudging
only parents is more than 2-fold that of nudging both parents and teachers (the
difference significant at the 1% level; column 1 in Table C1).
B. Teacher effort
Why do nudges dramatically improve the prospects that children remain in
school when parents are nudged, but not when the intervention targets both
parents and teachers? This section documents treatment effects on teacher effort.
We analyze three dimensions of effort: teacher absenteeism , teachers’ time
use, and the extent to which teachers target instruction to top students in the
classroom. All those dimensions should matter for learning and school dropouts.
Students cannot learn if teachers are not in the classroom, and we have shown that
variation in teacher attendance correlates with improvements in tests scores in
our sample (Figure 1); willingness to invest in professional development activities
should map into higher-quality instruction; and ‘teaching to the top’ (characteris-
tic of teaching practices in Sub-Saharan Africa; Duflo, Duplas and Kremer, 2011,
e.g.) tends to leave students who struggle behind.
Table 3 displays treatment effects on the first two dimensions. Attendance is
captured by the average share of classes in the two weeks prior to each survey
for which the teacher was in the classroom, according to students, and time use
is captured by the time teachers report they are willing to allocate weekly to
professional development activities, collected in the follow-up survey.
Average teacher attendance was high at the time prior to the baseline survey –
students state that teachers were absent only about 10% of the time. There is sig-
nificant heterogeneity across classrooms, however, as in some teacher attendance
was as low as 50% at that point (see Figure G1). As such, while the table shows
that the interventions do not significantly affect teacher attendance on average
(column 1), the full sample masks substantial heterogeneity. In effect, if nudges
barely move teacher effort for teachers who were above-median baseline atten-
dance (column 2), nudges to parents systematically increase teacher attendance
(significant at the 10% level; column 3). The effect size is relevant, equivalent to a
23.4% decrease in teacher absenteeism relative to the control group, or over 6 ad-
ditional periods of classes over the course of the school year.31 Strikingly, nudges
to both parents and teachers actually increase absenteeism among those teachers,
by nearly the same magnitude – even though those low-attendance teachers are
31Students report on how many classes teachers missed out of 10 periods in the 2 weeks prior to the
survey. With morning and afternoon classes every weekday, teachers are absent on average for 1 period
every 2 weeks, or 20 periods over the course of the school year. An effect size of -2.5 p.p. stands for a
23.4% lower probability that the teacher misses 1 period of classes over that period, or 4.7 additional
periods of classes over the course of the school year.
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Table 3—Teacher absenteeism and time use
Teacher absenteeism
All Above- Below- Professional
teachers median median development
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parents -0.0080 -0.0253* 0.0051 -0.2772
(0.0087) (0.0141) (0.0107) (0.2015)
Teachers 0.0032 -0.0004 0.0042 -0.6219***
(0.0088) (0.0145) (0.0100) (0.2048)
Both 0.0191 0.0252 0.0070 -0.5885***
(0.0123) (0.0212) (0.0111) (0.1979)
Control group mean 0.0927 0.1081 0.0804 0.0000
Parents = Both [p-value] 0.0276 0.0191 0.8781 0.1222
Teachers = Both [p-value] 0.2063 0.2209 0.8136 0.8704
Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes No
Predicted propensity scores Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 1,940 949 991 273
R-squared 0.0137 0.0369 0.0194 0.0659
Note: Parents = 1 in schools where only parents are nudged, and 0 otherwise; Teachers = 1 in schools
where only teachers are nudged, and 0 otherwise; and Both = 1 in schools where both parents and
teachers are nudged, and 0 otherwise. In columns (1) to (3), teacher absenteeism stands for the share
of days on which teachers were absent from the classroom over the two weeks prior to the survey,
according to students. In column (4), the dependent variable is the standardized value of teacher-
reported willingness to invest time in professional development weekly, collected in the follow-up. In
columns (1) to (3), we use end-line data only and control for baseline students’ characteristics, grade
fixed effects and for the predicted probability of students to be tracked at end line (as well as the
square and cubic terms of this variable), predicted using a logistic regression of a dummy indicating
tracking at end line on baseline students’ characteristics in the control group. Baseline characteristics
consist in child gender; standardized baseline grades (numeracy and literacy); standardized parental
engagement; standardized student effort; standardized child labor; standardized socio-emotional skills;
standardized working memory; standardized visual attention; standardized impulsivity; standardized
self-esteem; standardized mindset. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the classroom level in
columns (1) to (3). * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
20 MONTH YEAR
precisely the ones would presumably require (and react the most to) community
monitoring. We can reject that this effect size is equal to that of nudges to parents
within this sub-sample and in the full sample (both at the 5% level, columns 1
and 3). This is not merely the results on intervening on teachers; nudging them
only does not affect teacher attendance across the board.
Figure 2 summarizes the discussion of heterogeneous treatment effects, normal-
izing effect sizes with respect to the control group mean within each sub-sample
to give a sense of the economic significance of treatment effects.
Figure 2. Treatment effects on teacher effort, by baseline absenteeism
Note: Teacher absenteeism stands for the share of days on which teachers were absent from the classroom
over the 2 weeks prior to the survey, according to students. Median of teachers’ baseline absenteeism
is 9.52%. We use end-line data only and control for baseline students’ characteristics, grade fixed ef-
fects and for the predicted probability of students to be tracked at end line (as well as the square and
cubic terms of this variable), predicted using a logistic regression of a dummy indicating tracking at
end line on baseline students’ characteristics in the control group. Baseline characteristics consist in
child gender; standardized baseline grades (numeracy and literacy); standardized parental engagement;
standardized student effort; standardized child labor; standardized socio-emotional skills; standardized
working memory; standardized visual attention; standardized impulsivity; standardized self-esteem; stan-
dardized mindset. Dark grey bars stand for treatment effect sizes of nudging parents independently; light
grey bars, those of nudging teachers independently; and white bars, those of nudging both concurrently.
P-values shown in dark brackets.
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When it comes to teachers’ time use, we find that all nudges decrease the extent
to which they are willing to dedicate time to professional development activities
(column 4), but effects are much larger when teachers are monitored directly (con-
currently with parents or not, significant at the 1% level). Effect sizes are large:
while the median teacher states that she is willing to dedicate 2-4 hours a week to
professional development activities, nudges to teachers would be nearly enough
to bring her down to the previous bracket (1-2 hours a week). Nudging parents
and teachers simultaneously does not magnify the negative effects of nudges to
teachers in that case.
Next, we turn to the issue of instruction targeting: do nudges lead teachers to
focus on top students to a greater extent? To study that question, we analyze
whether the characteristics of students who abandon school vary systematically
across treatment arms; in particular, we are interested in whether students at
the bottom of the class drop out to a greater extent when parents or teachers
are nudged, relative to the control group, and also in whether such patterns vary
when both parents and teachers are nudged relative to nudging only parents.
Because our administrative measure of school dropouts is only available at the
classroom level, we rely on our student-level proxy for this analysis.
We start by plotting the distribution of baseline standardized tests scores for
students whom we are unable to track at end line in Figure 3, with numeracy
on the left-hand side, and literacy on the right-hand side. In each column, the
dashed line highlights the bottom decile of baseline test scores (computed for the
control group). The figure suggests that nudges to parents or nudges to teachers
induce low-achieving students to drop out to a lesser extent; in both columns
(particularly for numeracy, on the LHS), there is a lower mass of the histogram
to the left of the dashed line relative to control schools. In contrast, in schools
where both parents and teachers are nudged, the mass of low-achieving students
among dropouts seem to be just the same as in control schools.
Table 4 takes those insights to a regression framework, estimating treatment
effects on whether student baseline test scores were in the bottom decile of the dis-
tribution. To deal with multiple comparisons, column 1 uses a summary measure,
averaging across indicator variables of whether students’ numeracy and literacy
standardized test scores lie in the bottom decile (p10), while columns 2 and 3
present treatment effects on each component.
The table shows that nudges to parents and nudges to teachers in fact decrease
the share of bottom students among those who abandon school relative to the
control group (significant at the 5% level in the case of nudges to teachers; column
1), while nudging both parents and teachers does exactly the opposite. We can
reject that the effects of nudging only teachers and that of nudging both parents
and teachers are the same (at the 5% level; column 1). The table also shows that
treatment effects on instruction targeting are similar across numeracy (column
2) and literacy (column 3), but particularly large for the former: the share of
students in the bottom decile of numeracy at baseline among those who abandon
22 MONTH YEAR
Figure 3. Instruction targeting: distribution of baseline standardized test scores
within students who we are unable to track at end line, by treatment cell
Note: First row for students in control schools; second row for students in schools where parents were
nudged independently; third row for students in schools where teachers were nudged independently;
and fourth row for students in schools where parents and teachers were nudged concurrently. Sample
restricted to students who were not tracked at end line. In both columns, dashed line at the bottom
decile of the respective baseline standardized test score in the control group among students whom we
were not able to track at end line.







Parents -0.2180 -0.0458 -0.0583
(0.1551) (0.0506) (0.0529)
Teachers -0.2424** -0.0811** -0.0372
(0.1185) (0.0344) (0.0389)
Both 0.0193 0.0197 -0.0092
(0.1570) (0.0660) (0.0412)
Control group mean 0.1505 0.1034 0.0920
Parents = Both [p-value] 0.1689 0.3705 0.3160
Teachers = Both [p-value] 0.0375 0.0562 0.3982
Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 268 268 268
R-squared 0.1270 0.0725 0.0867
Note: Parents = 1 in schools where only parents are nudged, and 0 otherwise; Teachers = 1 in schools
where only teachers are nudged, and 0 otherwise; and Both = 1 in schools where both parents and teachers
are nudged, and 0 otherwise. In column (1), the dependent variable averages across the standardized
value of outcome variables in columns (2) and (3), which are equal to 1 if the participant had a baseline
standardized test score in either numeracy (col. 2) or literacy (col. 3) below the 10th percentile of the
control group of the sample considered in each regression, and 0 otherwise. Sample restricted to students
who were not track at end line. Standard errors clustered at the classroom level in parentheses. * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
24 MONTH YEAR
school increases from 2.23 p.p. where only teachers are nudged to 12.31 p.p.
where nudges target both parents and teachers (a significant difference at the
10% level; column 2). In schools were only parents are nudged, that share is less
than half as large (5.76 p.p.).
C. Effects on parental engagement, student effort and learning
Next, we turn to the effects of the interventions on parents’ behavior and
students’ time use and standardized test scores. Because nudges affect school
dropouts – and, consequently, our ability to track students and their caregivers
at end line –, we control flexibly for each observations’ propensity score through-
out (see Section II.C).
First, we analyze treatment effects on parental engagement, captured through
several questions posed to students about their caregivers. Following our pre-
analysis plan, we compute indices of school participation (a summary measure of
the frequency at which parents (i) participate in school meetings; and (ii) talk to
teacher), help with academic activities (a summary measure of the frequency at
which parents (i) help with homework; and (ii) help organize school material),
motivation (a summary measure of the frequency at which parents (i) incentivize
school attendance; and (ii) incentivize studying), and dialogue (a summary mea-
sure of the frequency at which parents (i) ask about homework; ask about school
grades; and ask about how school was). Table 5 presents the results.
In schools where parents are nudged, students report a higher likelihood that
their parents show up in school to talk to teachers or participate in meetings, rel-
ative to control schools. Other than that, we find no systematic differences when
it comes to the extent to which parents help students with academic activities,
motivate them to study harder or talk to them about school. This is different
from the effects of nudges on parental engagement documented in Brazil (Bet-
tinger et al., 2020), where the intervention significantly increases the extent to
which parents help with academic activities, incentivize children to study harder,
engage in dialogue about their children’s school life, and aspire that their children
eventually makes it to college.
Differences are presumably linked to different social norms; in Sub-Saharan
Africa, children’s education is considered primarily a responsibility of the school.
As a leading example, Wolf (2020) collects qualitative evidence from structured in-
terviews with parents of 0-6 year-old children in Ghana, concluding that “Teachers
described parental school involvement as both providing resources (e.g., fundraising
and donating toys and materials) and engaging in their child’s education through
formal and informal meetings about the child’s progress. Teachers felt parents
were partly involved, with some parents engaged in both forms of involvement,
others who only provided material resources to the school, and others who did
neither. Parents, on other hand, mostly described their involvement as paying
school fees and providing donations and resources to the school” (p.3). For our
purposes, that provides an empirical opportunity to use nudges to parents as an
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parents 0.1128* -0.0330 -0.0084 -0.0096
(0.0631) (0.0627) (0.0542) (0.0519)
Teachers 0.0328 -0.0759 0.0213 -0.0010
(0.0610) (0.0599) (0.0560) (0.0529)
Both -0.0652 0.0126 -0.0341 0.0102
(0.0633) (0.0593) (0.0566) (0.0465)
Parents = Both [p-value] 0.0055 0.4831 0.6308 0.6848
Teachers = Both [p-value] 0.1126 0.1525 0.3223 0.8248
Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Predicted propensity scores Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,176 2,176 2,176 2,176
R-squared 0.0172 0.0238 0.1255 0.0736
Note: Parents = 1 in schools where only parents are nudged, and 0 otherwise; Teachers = 1 in schools
where only teachers are nudged, and 0 otherwise; and Both = 1 in schools where both parents and teach-
ers are nudged, and 0 otherwise. In column (1), the outcome variable is constructed from the following
individual components asked to parents: frequency at which parents participate in school meetings; and
frequency at which parents talk to teacher. In column (2), the outcome variable is constructed from the
following individual components asked to parents: frequency at which parents help with homework; fre-
quency at which parents help organize school material. In column (3), the outcome variable is constructed
from the following individual components asked to parents: frequency at which parents incentivize school
attendance; frequency at which parents incentivize studying. In column (4), the outcome variable is con-
structed from the following individual components asked to parents: frequency at which parents ask
about homework; frequency at which parents ask about school grades; frequency at which parents ask
how school was. For all outcomes, we follow Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007) by standardizing each com-
ponent within grade (normalizing by their mean and standard deviation among the control group) and
then averaging across them in order to construct the variable. In all columns, we use end-line data only
and control for baseline students’ characteristics, grade fixed effects and for the predicted probability of
students to be tracked at end line (as well as the square and cubic terms of this variable), predicted using
a logistic regression of a dummy indicating tracking at end line on baseline students’ characteristics in the
control group. Baseline characteristics consist in child gender; standardized baseline grades (numeracy
and literacy); standardized parental engagement; standardized student effort; standardized child labor;
standardized socio-emotional skills; standardized working memory; standardized visual attention; stan-
dardized impulsivity; standardized self-esteem; standardized mindset. Standard errors in parentheses
clustered at the classroom level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
26 MONTH YEAR
intervention that affects children’s education exclusively through higher-intensity
monitoring of teachers.
In schools where both parents and teachers are nudged, it is not just that
parental engagement does not systematically increase; if anything, school partic-
ipation actually decreases relative to the control group, according to children. In
those schools, students feel their parents are less actively involved in their edu-
cation even though teachers perceive exactly the opposite (Section III). We can
reject that the coefficients of nudges to parents and nudges to both are equal at
the 1% level (column 1). That is not merely an effect of nudging teachers, as its
effect size is small but positive (p-value for the difference is 0.113).
Next, we analyze treatment effects on the use of violence as a disciplining
strategy, captured through questions posed to caregivers about whether they find
appropriate to punish children across difference instances (or had recently done
so). Following our pre-analysis plan, we average across indices of discipline without
violence (a summary measure of whether someone in the household (i) took away
privileges, forbade something the child likes, or did not allow the child to leave
the house in the past month; (ii) explained why the child’s behavior was wrong in
the past month; and (iii) gave the child something else to do in the past month),
physical violence (a summary measure of whether someone in the household (i)
shook the child in the past month; (ii) hit or spanked the child with bare hand in
the past month; (iii) spanked the child or hit him/her elsewhere on the body with
something like a belt, hairbrush, stick or other hard object in the past month;
(iv) hit or slapped the child on the face, head or ears in the past month; (v) hit
or slapped the child on the hand, arm, or leg in the past month; (vi) hit the
child over and over as hard as one could in the past month; and (vii) believes
that in order to bring up, raise, or educate a child properly, the child needs to be
physically punished) and psychological violence (a summary measure of whether
someone in the household (i) shouted, yelled at or screamed at the child in the
past month; and (ii) called the child dumb, lazy, or another name like that in
the past month). Naturally, the without violence index enters negatively into the
violence summary measure. Table 6 presents the results.
The table shows that nudging either parents or teachers does not systematically
affect the extent to which parents resort to violence in disciplining children. Hav-
ing said that, nudging both parents and teachers decreases the extent to which
parents resort to non-violent disciplining strategies, relative to schools where ei-
ther parents or teachers are nudged independently (significant at the 1% and 5%
levels, respectively; column 2). As we find no treatment effects of nudges to both
on corporal or psychological violence, such decrease in non-violent disciplining
strategies in those schools means that either those parents do not disclose that
they resort to violence to a greater extent as a disciplining strategy, or that they
merely communicate less with their children overall – both of which are adversar-
ial to child development (Wolf and Suntheimer, 2020b).
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Table 6—Treatment effects on the use of violence as a disciplining strategy
Components
Summary Without Physical Psychological
measure violence violence violence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parents -0.0065 0.0877* 0.0487 0.0194
(0.0254) (0.0492) (0.0506) (0.0579)
Teachers -0.0197 0.0463 0.0087 -0.0216
(0.0286) (0.0465) (0.0611) (0.0560)
Both 0.0240 -0.0491 0.0056 0.0175
(0.0281) (0.0438) (0.0517) (0.0582)
Parents = Both [p-value] 0.2469 0.0036 0.3604 0.9726
Teachers = Both [p-value] 0.1390 0.0283 0.9561 0.4605
Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Predicted propensity scores Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,176 2,176 2,176 2,176
R-squared 0.0080 0.0168 0.0112 0.0068
Note: Parents = 1 in schools where only parents are nudged, and 0 otherwise; Teachers = 1 in schools
where only teachers are nudged, and 0 otherwise; and Both = 1 in schools where both parents and teachers
are nudged, and 0 otherwise. In column (1), the outcome averages across the outcomes of columns (2)
to (4) (with the outcome of col. (1) set to negative). In column (2), the outcome variable is constructed
from the following individual components asked to caregivers: whether someone in the household took
away privileges, forbade something the child likes (e.g., watching TV, playing with friends) or did not
allow the child to leave the house in the past month; whether someone in the household explained why
the child’s behavior was wrong in the past month; whether someone in the household gave the child
something else to do in the past month. In column (3), the outcome variable is constructed from the
following individual components asked to caregivers: whether someone in the household shook the child
in the past month; whether someone in the household hit or spanked the child with bare hand in the
past month; whether someone in the household spanked the child or hit him/her elsewhere on the body
with something like a belt, hairbrush, stick or other hard object in the past month; whether someone
in the household hit or slapped the child on the face, head or ears in the past month; whether someone
in the household hit or slapped the child on the hand, arm, or leg in the past month; whether someone
in the household beat the child up, that is hit him/her over and over as hard as one could in the past
month; whether the caregiver believes that in order to bring up, raise, or educate a child properly,
the child needs to be physically punished. In column (4), the outcome variable is constructed from
the following individual components asked to caregivers: whether someone in the household shouted,
yelled at or screamed at the child in the past month; whether someone in the household called the
child dumb, lazy, or another name like that in the past month. For all outcomes, we follow Kling,
Liebman and Katz (2007) by standardizing each component within grade (normalizing by their mean
and standard deviation among the control group) and then averaging across them in order to construct
the variable. In all columns, we use end-line data only and control for baseline students’ characteristics,
grade fixed effects and for the predicted probability of students to be tracked at end line (as well as
the square and cubic terms of this variable), predicted using a logistic regression of a dummy indicating
tracking at end line on baseline students’ characteristics in the control group. Baseline characteristics
consist in child gender; standardized baseline grades (numeracy and literacy); standardized parental
engagement; standardized student effort; standardized child labor; standardized socio-emotional skills;
standardized working memory; standardized visual attention; standardized impulsivity; standardized
self-esteem; standardized mindset. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the classroom level. *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Last, we estimate treatment effects on parents’ beliefs, students’ time use and
standardized test scores. Parents’ beliefs are a summary measure of their best
estimate of their children’s (i) current math GPA (1-10); (ii) current French GPA
(1-10); (iii) current overall GPA (1-10); and (iv) future overall GPA (1-10). Stu-
dents’ time use (self-reported) is a summary measure of whether they (i) study at
home on a general weekday; (ii) listen to the radio on a general weekday; and (iii)
read a book, a newspaper or magazines on a general weekday.32 When it comes
to test scores, as discussed in Section II.B, we adapt PASEC’s and IDELA’s items
to assess learning in math and French at baseline and end line. Table 7 presents
the results.
Different from Bettinger et al. (2020), Bergman (2021) and Dizon-Ross (2019),
we cannot assess the extent to which parents are more or less accurate about their
children’s school performance because there is no administrative data on grades
in Ivory Coast. Having said that, the table shows that nudges make parents more
pessimistic about students’ grades relative to those in control schools, consistent
with nudges making over-optimistic parents’ beliefs closer to the ground truth,
as in Bettinger et al. (2020). Effect sizes are larger and more precisely estimated
when teachers are nudged, but particularly so in schools where parents and teach-
ers are nudged concurrently (significantly different from nudges to parents only,
at the 5% level; column 1). Patterns are consistent with parents becoming too
pessimistic about their children’s school standing in those schools relative to the
control group, and could help explain why parents in those schools communicate
to children to a lesser extent and are perceived by children as less engaged in their
school life than those in other schools.
As a result, even though student effort increases similarly across all treatment
cells relative to the control group (imprecisely estimated, in column 2), children
learn more only where only parents are nudged. Standardized test scores increase
by 0.07 (p=0.109; column 3). This is a large effect size, as if those students had
spent approximately an additional quarter in school than those in control schools
(benchmarking to the average difference in test scores between the baseline and
end line assessments in each subject). Results are driven equally by numeracy
(column 4) and literacy (column 5). In turn, the effect size of nudging both
parents and teachers is actually negative, and we can reject that it is equal to
that of nudging parents alone (at the 5% level; column 3).
32We include listening to radio as part of the engagement summary measure in face of the evidence
that this develops language skills, particularly in the earlier grades (Abimpaye et al., 2019). In fact, only
35% of children in our sample report listening to radio at baseline.
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Table 7—Treatment effects on parental beliefs, student effort, and learning
Components
Test scores
Parents’ Student summary Numeracy Literacy
beliefs effort measure (std.) (std.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Parents -0.0654 0.0552 0.0674 0.0698* 0.0649
(0.0589) (0.0474) (0.0418) (0.0407) (0.0498)
Teachers -0.1203** 0.0531 -0.0340 -0.0010 -0.0670
(0.0532) (0.0463) (0.0361) (0.0376) (0.0438)
Both -0.2050*** 0.0437 -0.0139 0.0033 -0.0311
(0.0635) (0.0415) (0.0353) (0.0384) (0.0406)
Parents = Both [p-value] 0.0346 0.7571 0.0303 0.0962 0.0285
Teachers = Both [p-value] 0.1730 0.7888 0.5124 0.9068 0.3222
Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Predicted propensity scores Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,013 2,243 2,243 2,243 2,243
R-squared 0.0695 0.0799 0.5714 0.4829 0.5350
Note: Parents = 1 in schools where only parents are nudged, and 0 otherwise; Teachers = 1 in schools
where only teachers are nudged, and 0 otherwise; and Both = 1 in schools where both parents and teach-
ers are nudged, and 0 otherwise. In column (1), the outcome variable is constructed from the following
individual components asked to caregivers: parental beliefs about performance in mathematics; parental
beliefs about performance in French; parental beliefs about overall school performance; parental beliefs
about future school performance. In column (2), the outcome variable is a summary measure constructed
from the following individual components asked to students, equal to 1 if answer is sometimes or more
more often, and 0 otherwise: whether they study at home on a general weekday; whether they listen
to the radio on a general weekday; whether they read a book, a newspaper or magazines on a general
weekday. In column (3), the summary measure averages across numeracy and literacy standardized test
scores. In column (4), the outcome variable is a summary measure constructed from individual compo-
nents consisting in mathematics exercises completed by students. In column (5), the outcome variable
is a summary measure constructed from individual components consisting in French exercises completed
by students. For all outcomes, we follow Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007) by standardizing each com-
ponent within grade (normalizing by their mean and standard deviation among the control group) and
then averaging across them in order to construct the variable. In all columns, we use end-line data only
and control for baseline students’ characteristics, grade fixed effects and for the predicted probability
of students to be tracked at end line (as well as the square and cubic terms of this variable), predicted
using a logistic regression of a dummy indicating tracking at end line on baseline students’ characteris-
tics in the control group. Baseline characteristics consist in child gender; standardized baseline grades
(numeracy and literacy); standardized parental engagement; standardized student effort; standardized
child labor; standardized socio-emotional skills; standardized working memory; standardized visual at-
tention; standardized impulsivity; standardized self-esteem; standardized mindset. Standard errors in
parentheses clustered at the classroom level. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the classroom
level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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D. Heterogeneous treatment effects by grade and gender
Appendix G documents that the patterns for treatment effects on students
dropouts are identical within each grade: the effect size of the joint intervention
is always much smaller than those of intervening independently on each party.
Effects are especially large among older children: strikingly, dropout rates fall
by nearly 75% at the final primary cycle in response to nudging either parents
or teachers. Still, the treatment effect of nudges to both within that grade is
again not only statistically insignificant, but less than 10% the dropout rate in
the control group.
When it comes to gender, Appendix G shows that treatment effects on teacher
effort do not vary systematically across males and females. In contrast, there is
substantial heterogeneity when it comes to treatment effects by students’ gender.
Just as in Bettinger et al. (2020), boys benefit to a greater extent when it comes
to impacts on test scores. Having said that, it is girls who benefit more in terms
of student dropouts (differences are not very precisely estimated as we can only
resort to proxy dropouts to analyze student-level differences). Those patterns are
consistent with additional hurdles for girls to remain in school beyond academic
performance.33 Incidentally, too intense monitoring does not backfire for girls’
dropout rates, suggesting that important forces that push girls out of school are
concentrated on within-household dynamics above and beyond parental beliefs
about girls’ educational standing.34
V. Mechanisms
Why does monitoring backfire when both parents and teachers are nudged?
This section turns to the mechanisms behind non-monotonic effects of monitoring
teachers. Subsection V.A starts by investigating the extent to which accountabil-
ity triggered by nudges crowds out teachers’ intrinsic motivation. Next, subsection
V.B documents that too-high monitoring intensity backfires even when teachers
do not know that parents are nudged, and even when we do not intervene on
the latter. Last, subsection V.C showcases that teachers’ optimal effort levels
in response to community monitoring is indeed non-monotonic with respect to
monitoring intensity.
A. Crowding-out of teachers’ intrinsic motivation
We start by estimating heterogeneous treatment effects with respect to teachers’
intrinsic motivation, cutting the sample according to whether teachers were above
or below the baseline median. Teacher motivation is a summary measure of 16
questions, based on the extent to which teachers agree that they look for new
33In effect, dropout rates are higher among girls even though they have higher tests scores than boys
at baseline; see Wolf and Lichand (2020); UNICEF (2019).
34One such particular force is the distribution of household chores; see UNICEF (2019) for a discussion
of differences in time use between boys and girls.
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ways to teach because (i) they think it is important not to always teach the same
way, (ii) they feel it is important to keep up with innovations in teaching, (iii)
they think it is fun, or (iv) they want to please parents; on the extent to which
teachers agree that they would feel (v) ashamed or (vi) guilty if they would not
put effort into teaching; on the extent to which teachers agree that motivations
for doing so are (vii) making children feel like they care, (viii) helping people, the
joy of (ix) finding unique solutions for various students, or that of (x) sustaining
children’s attention, (xi) creating connections with people, or (xii) keeping their
independence from the principal; and on the extent to which teachers agree that
they (xiii) feel proud, (xiv) learn from students, (xv) have parents appreciate
their knowledge, or (xvi) like being in touch with children and adolescents when
they dedicate time to help students individually.35
Figure 4 summarizes the estimates of heterogeneous treatment effects with re-
spect to teacher’ baseline motivation, normalizing effect sizes with respect to the
control group mean within each sub-sample to give a sense of the economic sig-
nificance of treatment effects.
The figure collects two interesting findings. First, nudges do not help ensure
teachers are more often in the classroom when they lack intrinsic motivation:
no intervention decreases teacher absenteeism for the least motivated at baseline
(on the RHS). Second, even though nudges to either parents or teachers decrease
teacher absenteeism for those most intrinsically motivated at baseline (although
imprecisely estimated), nudging both parents and teachers backfires precisely for
those teachers: their absenteeism significantly increases in this case relative to the
control group (significant at the 10% level, on the LHS). The effect size is huge,
two-fold that of nudging both parents and teachers among those most absent
at baseline (see Section IV.B), and statistically different from that of nudging
parents only (at the 1% level, on the LHS) and from that of nudging both parents
and teachers among those least motivated at baseline (at the 5% level, on the
RHS).
Estimating heterogeneous treatment effects on student dropouts yields remark-
ably similar patterns for when nudges backfire. Figure 5 shows that nudges to
parents induce sizeable effects on school dropouts across all teachers: dropout
rates decrease by 42.5% within those with below-median baseline motivation (on
the RHS), and by 41.1% within those most intrinsically motivated at baseline (on
the LHS). In turn, nudging both parents and teachers increases dropouts amongst
those most intrinsically motivated at baseline (p-value for the difference is 0.22,
on the LHS). This is the case even though nudging teachers decreases student
dropouts by 42.8% in that case (p-value for the difference is 0.23, on the LHS).
Using our survey proxy for student dropouts confirms those patterns – only
more precisely estimated with student-level data. Appendix B shows that while
35What economists think of as intrinsic motivation (as opposed to extrinsic motivation) comprises
multiple concepts in the education literature: intrinsic motivation, introjected motivation, identified
motivation, and even extrinsic motivation; see (Roth et al., 2007).
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Figure 4. Heterogeneous treatment effects of monitoring on teacher effort, by
baseline motivation
Note: Teacher absenteeism stands for the share of days on which teachers were absent from the classroom
over the 2 weeks prior to the survey, according to students. Teachers’ motivation is constructed following
Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007) by standardizing each motivation component within grade (normalizing
by their mean and standard deviation among the control group) and then averaging across them in order
to construct the variable. We use end-line data only and control for baseline students’ characteristics,
grade fixed effects and for the predicted probability of students to be tracked at end line (as well as
the square and cubic terms of this variable), predicted using a logistic regression of a dummy indicating
tracking at end line on baseline students’ characteristics in the control group. Baseline characteristics
consist in child gender; standardized baseline grades (numeracy and literacy); standardized parental
engagement; standardized student effort; standardized child labor; standardized socio-emotional skills;
standardized working memory; standardized visual attention; standardized impulsivity; standardized
self-esteem; standardized mindset. Dark grey bars stand for treatment effect sizes of nudging parents
independently; light grey bars, those of nudging teachers independently; and white bars, those of nudging
both concurrently. P-values shown in dark brackets.
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nudging only parents decreases dropout rates by 29.3-37.8% across all teach-
ers, once again nudging both parents and teachers increases dropouts amongst
those most intrinsically motivated at baseline; the effect sizes are different at the
10% level (on the LHS). In turn, nudging parents and teachers decreases student
dropouts by nearly 50% for the teachers least intrinsically motivated at baseline
(the difference is significant at the 10% level, on the RHS).
Figure 5. Heterogeneous treatment effects of monitoring on student dropouts, by
baseline teacher motivation
Note: Student dropouts available only at the classroom-level. Dark grey bars stand for treatment effect
sizes of nudging parents independently; light grey bars, those of nudging teachers independently; and
white bars, those of nudging both concurrently. We control for grade fixed effects. P-values shown in
dark brackets.
All in all, results are consistent with external monitoring crowding out teachers’
intrinsic motivation.
B. Conditional responses to community monitoring
Is non-monotonicity a general property of how teachers react to monitoring
intensity, or is our finding an artifact of intervening on parents and teachers at
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the same time? To answer this question, we first take advantage of the fact that
teachers were systematically unaware that parents were nudged when messages
were delivered via audio (see Section III).
Figure 6 summarizes the estimates of heterogeneous treatment effects with re-
spect to whether parents receive nudged via text or audio messages on teacher
absenteeism (Panel A) and student dropouts (Panel B), based on administrative
data. Effect sizes are normalized with respect to the control group mean within
each sub-sample to give a sense of the economic significance of treatment effects.
Panel A illustrates very interesting patterns, although imprecisely estimated.
There is a clear ranking of effect sizes across text and audio: nudging only par-
ents decreases absenteeism, while nudging only teachers has nearly zero effects.
Most importantly, nudging both parents and teachers leads to sizeable increases in
teacher absenteeism in both cases. Even though text messages magnify the extent
to which nudging both parents and teachers backfires (when perceived monitoring
intensity is even higher), nudges via audio messages also increase teacher absen-
teeism when teachers are nudged concurrently even though the latter do not know
that parents are nudged as well.
Panel B shows similar patterns for treatment effects on student dropouts. While
nudging either teacher or parents significantly decrease dropouts in this case (by
roughly 50%, regardless of whether via text or audio), nudging parents and teach-
ers does not significantly decrease it in both cases. Even though its effect is even
smaller in magnitude (and even slightly positive) when nudges are delivered via
text messages, it is also less than 1/4 the effect size of nudging only parents when
they are targeted by audio messages – in which case teachers are systematically
unaware. In sum, non-monotonic responses to monitoring intensity are not an
artifact of teachers’ knowledge of nudges to parents.
Next, we estimate heterogeneous treatment effects of community monitoring
on learning outcomes, restricting attention to schools where parents were not
nudged. We estimate a quadratic relationship between standardized test scores
and the share of parents who monitor teachers, separately within control schools
and within those where only teachers are nudged.36 To do that, we leverage stu-
dents’ answers to the end-line survey question of how often their parents showed
up in school to talk to their teachers over the course of the experiment to com-
pute the classroom-level share of parents who show up sometimes or more often.
Accordingly, we average test scores at the classroom level. Table 8 presents the
results. Odd columns restrict attention to the control group, and even columns, to
schools where only teachers were nudged. Columns (1) and (2) display estimates
for the summary measure of standardized test scores, and the other columns to
its components (numeracy in columns 3 and 4, and literacy in columns 5 and 6).
The table shows that, while there is no systematic relationship between commu-
36We use test scores in this analysis instead of dropouts because the latter are a relatively rare outcome;
with dropout rates equal to zero across several schools, the statistical power to detect a quadratic
relationship is greatly reduced.
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Figure 6. Heterogeneous treatment effects of monitoring on teacher effort and
student dropouts, for audio vs text messages
Panel A: Teacher effort
Panel B: Student dropouts
Note: In Panel A, teacher absenteeism stands for the share of days on which teachers were absent from
the classroom over the 2 weeks prior to the survey, according to students. In Panel B, student dropouts
available only at the classroom-level. In Panel A, we use end-line data only and control for baseline
students’ characteristics, grade fixed effects and for the predicted probability of students to be tracked
at end line (as well as the square and cubic terms of this variable), predicted using a logistic regression
of a dummy indicating tracking at end line on baseline students’ characteristics in the control group.
Baseline characteristics consist in child gender; standardized baseline grades (numeracy and literacy);
standardized parental engagement; standardized student effort; standardized child labor; standardized
socio-emotional skills; standardized working memory; standardized visual attention; standardized impul-
sivity; standardized self-esteem; standardized mindset. Dark grey bars stand for treatment effect sizes
of nudging parents independently; light grey bars, those of nudging teachers independently; and white
bars, those of nudging both concurrently. P-values shown in dark brackets.
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Table 8—Heterogeneous treatment effects of monitoring on end line standardized
test scores
Summary measure Std. numeracy Std. literacy
Control Teacher Control Teacher Control Teacher
only only only only only only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of parents who -1.4937 3.3528* -2.1532 3.5030* -0.8342 3.2027
show up in school (2.2523) (1.8393) (1.9974) (2.0720) (2.6022) (2.0260)
(Share of parents who 1.3452 -2.3051* 1.6968 -2.3130 0.9936 -2.2971
show up in school)2 (1.6978) (1.2878) (1.4867) (1.4315) (1.9730) (1.4586)
Equality of square 0.0756 0.0439 0.1642
coefficients across samples
Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50
R-squared 0.0258 0.0545 0.0278 0.0653 0.0275 0.0425
Note: In columns (1) and (2), the outcome variable averages across numeracy and literacy standardized
test scores. In columns (3) and (4), the outcome is a summary measure constructed from individual
components consisting in mathematics exercises completed by students. In columns (5) and (6), the
outcome is a summary measure constructed from individual components consisting in French exercises
completed by students. For each outcome, we follow Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007) by standardizing
each component within grade (normalizing by their mean and standard deviation among the control
group) and then averaging across them in order to construct the variable. Each outcome is averaged at
the classroom level. In columns (1),(3) and (5), the sample is restricted to control schools only. In columns
(2), (4) and (6), the sample is restricted to schools where only teachers received nudges. The share of
parents who show up in school is the classroom-level average of children who answer ”sometimes” or more
often to the end-line survey question ”How often do your parents or guardians talk to your teachers?”.
Standard errors clustered at the classroom level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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nity monitoring and learning in the control group (column 1), there is a robust in-
verse U-shaped association between the two in schools where teachers are nudged
(significant at the 10% level, column 2). The squared coefficient is significantly
different across the two sub-samples (at the 10% level), and the relationship is
very similar across numeracy (columns 3 and 4) and literacy (columns 5-6) test
scores, even though more precisely estimated for the former.
Figure 7 shows that, if anything, test scores actually increase with community
monitoring in the control group (Panel A); in contrast, in schools where teachers
are nudged (Panel B), test scores first increase with the share of parents who
show up in school, but then stall and eventually decrease as the share of parents
who show up in school frequently surpasses 75%.
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Figure 7. Heterogeneous treatment effects of monitoring on test scores
Panel A: Control group
Panel B: Teachers only
Note: Bin-scatter plots of end line standardized test scores as a function of the share of parents who
show up in school regularly, within the sub-samples of control schools (Panel A) and those where only
teachers receive nudges (Panel B). The dependent and independent variables are described in Table 8.
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C. Best-response functions
Last, we elicit parents’ and teachers’ planned effort levels in response to different
effort levels by the other party. For parents, we ask how they would change
their effort in response to teacher requests to show up in school, and in response
to teacher absenteeism, varying the frequency of teacher requests and teacher
attendance in each case. For teachers, we ask how they would change their effort
in response to parents showing up in school unannounced to talk about their
children, varying both the frequency of community monitoring and its intensity
(for 1 out of 10 parents or 10 out of 10 parents showing up at the specified
frequency). Effort changes are measured in a scale from -2 (“decrease a lot”) to
2 (“increase a lot”). Figure 8 presents the average responses for parents (Panel
A) and teachers (Panel B), standardizing effort levels within each question.
From the way parents specify that they would change effort in response to teach-
ers’ requests, in Panel A, we can infer that the average teacher never demands
that parents show up in school. We can also infer that parents expect teachers
to be in class teaching more often than once a week, although not everyday; if
that were the case, parents would increase their effort substantially, as much as
if teachers would request them to come to school everyday. Most importantly,
the figure shows that parents’ best-response function is monotonic: the extent
to which parents state that they would engage in their children’s education is
increasing in the frequency at which teachers request them to come to school,
and in the frequency at which teachers are in the classroom teaching.
In turn, Panel B shows that, while teachers’ best-response function with respect
to the frequency of community monitoring is monotonically increasing when it
comes to a small number of parents, it bears an inverted U-shaped relationship
with respect to the frequency of monitoring when all parents show up in school
at that frequency. For low-frequency monitoring, the more parents show up in
school, the better: the level of effort teachers specify increases with the number
of parents who show up in school as frequently as once a week. Teachers’ planned
effort level, however, dramatically decreases if all parents were to show up in
school every day – down to roughly the same effort level as if parents only showed
up in school once a year.
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Figure 8. Parents’ and teachers’ best-response functions
Panel A: Parents
Panel B: Teachers
Note: Panel A showcases mean changes in effort by parents, computed from answers to the questions
“During the last school year, how would your involvement in your child’s education have changed if
their teacher had asked you to come to school to talk about what s/he was learning at the following
frequency?” and “During the last school year, how would your involvement in your child’s education
have changed if their teacher had been present in school teaching at the following frequency?”, where
frequency varies between “Never” and “Everyday”. We plot parents’ answer on a scale from -2 to 2,
where -2 means “decrease a lot”, 0 means “no change” and 2 means “increase a lot”. Panel B showcases
mean changes in effort by teachers, computed from answers to the questions “How would your effort in
teaching your classroom last year have changed in case 1 (10) out of 10 parents had showed up in school
unannounced to talk about what their child is learning at the following frequency?”, where frequency
varies between “Never” and “Everyday”. We plot parents’ answer on a scale from -2 to 2, where -2 means
“decrease a lot”, 0 means “no change” and 2 means “increase a lot”.
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VI. Concluding remarks
This paper documents first-hand that monitoring teachers can have non-monotonic
effects. In our experiment, teacher accountability interventions massively de-
creased school dropouts when teachers were monitored either directly, through
SMS nudges, or indirectly through community mobilization, but failed to im-
prove educational outcomes when implemented together. Too high monitoring
intensity backfires because it crowds out teachers’ intrinsic motivation, leading to
backlash: lower attendance, lower willingness to dedicate time to professional de-
velopment activities, and instruction targeting to a greater extent. Lower teacher
effort, in turn, triggered a chain reaction: in those schools, parents became overly
pessimistic, parent-child dialogue was affected, and learning outcomes no longer
improved. As a result, students dropped out of school to the same extent as if no
intervention had been in place.
Evidence from heterogeneous treatment effects when parents are nudged via
audio, and from the relationship between learning outcomes and community mon-
itoring when only teachers are nudged, attest that results are not an artifact of
our experimental design, but rather a general property of team production in
children’s education. In effect, we show that teachers’ best-response function is
indeed non-monotonic with respect to monitoring intensity.
Our findings match qualitative evidence about frustrated interactions between
teachers and parents, documented in the education literature (e.g. Wolf and Sun-
theimer, 2020a; Chikutuma, 2017). They are also consistent with Frey (1993)’s
conjecture, and with laboratory findings (e.g. Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Dickinson
and Villeval, 2008). In Dickinson and Villeval (2008), whether monitoring back-
fires above a certain threshold depends on whether reciprocity can be inferred by
the agent from the monitoring level set by the principal, and on the nature of
the relationship between principals and agents. They find that repeated inter-
actions increase the likelihood of backlash, and particularly so when employers’
payoffs depend primarily on workers’ output – which is precisely the nature of
the interactions between parents and teachers: children’s education is regarded
as primarily a function of teachers’ inputs, and interactions are non-anonymous
and repeated over a long horizon.
Educational policies could benefit from incorporating insights based on our find-
ings, particularly in developing countries – where education is a critical compo-
nent of investments in children’s human capital under stark informational asym-
metries, with far-ranging implications for growth and inequality (Glewwe and
Kremer, 2006). First, while monitoring interventions in education typically focus
on teachers (as in Duflo, Hanna and Ryan, 2012), we find that those might trigger
backlash if teachers are already highly motivated. That risk might be particularly
high in vulnerable communities, as teachers who accept those positions might be
the ones most intrinsically motivated to start with (which would be consistent
with Gertler, Patrinos and Rubio-Codina, 2012’s results). As such, effectively in-
tervening on teachers might require carefully eliciting their motivation and beliefs
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in order to inform targeting. Second, when it comes to participatory programs,
while they often encourage caregivers to monitor teachers quite intensely (e.g.
Banerjee et al., 2010), adapting that approach in face of non-monotonicity – ei-
ther by targeting a smaller share of parents in the community, or by moderating
the extent to which parents are encouraged to approach teachers – would likely
increase their effectiveness.
Those insights are by no means exclusive to education. From health to pub-
lic works, it is also the case that accountability programs sometimes work (e.g.
Nyqvist, de Walque and Svensson, 2017; Olken, 2007) but sometimes fail (e.g.
Raffler, Posner and Parkerson, 2019; Lichand and Fernandes, 2019). Thinking
carefully about monitoring intensity and the extent to which it can crowd-out
bureaucrats’ intrinsic motivation is central to the quality of governance agenda.
In particular, we show that accountability can backfire even without displacing
effort to margins less intensely monitored, and even in the absence of financial
incentives.
While our results shed light on puzzles in the literature, they also raise a number
of additional questions. For instance, could complementary interventions raise the
monitoring levels that highly motivated teachers find acceptable? Do financial
incentives (in particular, pay for performance) prevent or magnify backlash in
response to intense monitoring? Those are promising avenues for future research.
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Online Appendix A - Balance Tests
This Appendix compiles balance tests, to show that randomization was in fact
properly implemented. Tables A1 and A2 display sample means for each cell
when it comes to school characteristics (Panel A), caregiver characteristics (Panel
B), student characteristics (Panel C) and teacher characteristics (Panel D). The
tables display p-values for ANOVA tests of joint significance for differences in
means across cells. We find few statistical differences, all small in magnitude and
likely to emerge by chance given the large number of tests. In effect, F-tests for
joint significance rule out systematic imbalances across cells in each panel.
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Table A1—Descriptive statistics and balance tests
Sub-sample means ANOVA test # of
p-value obs.
Control Parents Teachers Both
Only Only
Panel A: School chars
Number of students enrolled 258.44 281.83 283.48 273.35 0.714 99
Number of teachers 6.20 5.57 5.72 6.19 0.073 99
Hot days 13.48 15.43 14.36 10.62 0.158 99
Meals provided 0.56 0.52 0.60 0.31 0.187 99
Chalks 2.52 2.52 2.76 2.58 0.743 99
Blackboards 2.16 2.26 2.16 2.00 0.756 99
Textbooks 3.48 3.35 3.52 3.50 0.798 99
Notebooks 2.20 2.52 2.60 2.77 0.180 99
Pens 2.44 2.52 2.84 2.88 0.354 99
Monthly teacher absenteeism 1.64 1.35 1.32 1.35 0.524 99
Daily students’ absence 7.12 11.22 11.16 8.38 0.653 99
F-test for nudges to parents 0.524 99
F-test for nudges to teachers 0.793 99
F-test for nudges to both 0.226 99
Panel B: Caregiver chars
Female share 0.42 0.37 0.45 0.40 0.190 2,471
Relationship with child 3.08 3.30 3.03 3.24 0.323 2,471
Marital status 1.98 1.98 2.05 2.02 0.254 2,471
Years as primary caregiver 5.89 6.20 6.52 5.94 0.110 2,441
Source of income 3.65 3.76 3.79 3.89 0.901 2,471
Ever attended school 1.38 1.41 1.42 1.43 0.575 2,471
Std. parental engagement -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 0.628 2,471
Std. mindset wrt children -0.07 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.627 2,471
Std. failure mindset -0.02 -0.07 -0.09 -0.06 0.578 2,471
Std. parental aspirations -0.01 0.02 -0.11 -0.03 0.314 2,471
Std. parental expectations -0.04 -0.01 -0.07 -0.03 0.794 2,471
Beliefs child attendance 0.61 0.61 0.57 0.65 0.887 2,454
Std. parents’ mental health 0.00 -0.08 -0.06 -0.08 0.106 2,471
Std. physical punishment 0.04 0.09 0.11 0.01 0.104 2,471
Std. child labor 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.09 0.503 2,471
Std. audio trust 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.833 2,408
Std. audio comprehension 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.02 0.599 2,408
Std. visual trust 0.00 -0.07 -0.05 0.04 0.427 2,408
Std. visual comprehension 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.07 0.601 2,408
Std. audio memory 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.675 2,475
Std. visual memory 0.00 -0.03 -0.12 -0.01 0.810 2,475
Std. audio attention 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.532 2,475
Std. visual attention 0.00 0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.224 2,475
F-test for nudges to parents 0.512 2,362
F-test for nudges to teachers 0.291 2,362
F-test for nudges to both 0.582 2,362
Note: P-values computed with standard errors clustered at the classroom level.
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Table A2—Descriptive statistics and balance tests
Sub-sample means ANOVA test # of
p-value obs.
Control Parents Teachers Both
Only Only
Panel C: Child chars
Std. literacy -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 -0.04 0.369 2,475
Std. numeracy -0.14 -0.12 -0.10 -0.08 0.770 2,475
Std. social-emotional -0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.869 2,475
Std. working memory -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 0.936 2,475
Female share 0.47 0.54 0.50 0.50 0.123 2,475
Std. child labor -0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.07 0.689 2,475
Std. self-esteem 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.869 2,475
Std. mindset -0.06 -0.11 -0.03 -0.08 0.649 2,475
Teacher absenteeism 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.936 2,104
Std. parental engagement -0.08 -0.13 -0.03 -0.04 0.162 2,475
Std. student effort -0.09 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 0.539 2,475
F-test for nudges to parents 0.115 2,104
F-test for nudges to teachers 0.797 2,104
F-test for nudges to both 0.542 2,104
Panel D: Teacher chars
Age 41.29 38.70 38.28 37.71 0.198 197
Years worked as teacher 14.88 11.48 10.74 10.25 0.097 197
Years worked at this school 7.04 5.22 5.06 5.52 0.423 197
Education 3.88 4.26 4.18 4.23 0.168 197
Completed the last level 1.53 1.43 1.42 1.37 0.408 197
Std. language skills 0.00 -0.34 -0.39 -0.19 0.065 197
Follow advice from SMS 3.92 3.67 3.80 3.83 0.134 197
Std. external motivation 0.02 0.24 0.01 0.00 0.280 197
Std. introjected motivation -0.02 0.05 -0.19 -0.12 0.374 197
Std. intrinsic motivation 0.04 0.10 -0.04 -0.03 0.756 197
Std. identified motivation -0.05 0.05 -0.13 -0.14 0.592 197
Std. failure mindset -0.05 -0.14 -0.19 -0.01 0.445 197
Std. job satisfaction 0.10 0.09 -0.04 -0.05 0.635 197
Teacher self-reported attendance 2.35 2.33 2.50 1.98 0.776 196
Arrive late 1.06 0.80 0.72 0.79 0.890 197
Leave early 0.14 0.11 0.16 0.27 0.674 197
F-test for nudges to parents 0.466 196
F-test for nudges to teachers 0.870 196
F-test for nudges to both 0.743 196
Note: P-values computed with standard errors clustered at the classroom level.
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Online Appendix B - Proxy Dropouts
This Appendix validates our estimates of treatment effects that use classroom-
level administrative data on student dropouts by using a survey proxy, equal to
1 if we cannot track a student between our baseline and end-line surveys, and 0
otherwise. As Figure B1 shows, proxy dropouts and administrative dropouts are
highly correlated. The remainder of the Appendix documents that the patterns
for treatment effects using administrative dropouts discussed in the main text are
similar to those found when we use proxy dropouts instead.
Figure B1. Binscatter plot of the survey proxy (averaged at the classroom level)
and administrative data on student dropouts
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Table B1—Treatment effects on proxy dropouts, by above- and below-median
teacher motivation and above- and below-median teacher absenteeism
Proxy dropouts
Median baseline motivation Median baseline absenteeism
All Above- Below- Above- Below-
teachers median median median median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Parents -0.0409* -0.0438 -0.0373 -0.0270 -0.0470
(0.0236) (0.0305) (0.0384) (0.0266) (0.0352)
Teachers -0.0262 -0.0368 -0.0196 0.0075 -0.0462
(0.0236) (0.0322) (0.0372) (0.0285) (0.0343)
Both -0.0338 0.0056 -0.0629* 0.0021 -0.0678**
(0.0227) (0.0291) (0.0355) (0.0279) (0.0331)
Control group mean 0.1209 0.1157 0.1273 0.1045 0.1331
Parents = Both [p-value] 0.7077 0.0856 0.3492 0.2493 0.4574
Teachers = Both [p-value] 0.6925 0.1620 0.0970 0.8328 0.4091
Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,462 1,220 1,242 1,243 1,232
R-squared 0.0087 0.0156 0.0172 0.0221 0.0173
Note: Parents = 1 in schools where only parents are nudged, and 0 otherwise; Teachers = 1 in schools
where only teachers are nudged, and 0 otherwise; and Both = 1 in schools where both parents and
teachers are nudged, and 0 otherwise. In all columns, the dependent variable equal to 0 if the participant
surveyed at baseline was successfully tracked at end line, and 1 otherwise. In columns (2) and (3),
teachers’ motivation is constructed following Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007) by standardizing each
motivation component within grade (normalizing by their mean and standard deviation among the control
group) and then averaging across them in order to construct the variable. In columns (4) and (5),
teacher absenteeism stands for the share of days on which teachers were absent from the classroom over
the 2 weeks prior to the survey, according to students. Median of teachers’ baseline absenteeism is
9.52%. We control for baseline students’ characteristics and grade fixed effects. Baseline characteristics
consist in child gender; standardized baseline grades (numeracy and literacy); standardized parental
engagement; standardized student effort; standardized child labor; standardized socio-emotional skills;
standardized working memory; standardized visual attention; standardized impulsivity; standardized
self-esteem; standardized mindset. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the classroom level. *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Figure B2. Heterogeneous treatment effects of monitoring on proxy dropouts, by
baseline teacher motivation
Note: Proxy dropouts equal to 0 if the participant surveyed at baseline was successfully tracked at end
line, and 1 otherwise. Teachers’ motivation is constructed following Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007) by
standardizing each motivation component within grade (normalizing by their mean and standard devi-
ation among the control group) and then averaging across them in order to construct the variable. We
control for baseline students’ characteristics and grade fixed effects. Baseline characteristics consist in
child gender; standardized baseline grades (numeracy and literacy); standardized parental engagement;
standardized student effort; standardized child labor; standardized socio-emotional skills; standardized
working memory; standardized visual attention; standardized impulsivity; standardized self-esteem; stan-
dardized mindset. Dark grey bars stand for treatment effect sizes of nudging parents independently; light
grey bars, those of nudging teachers independently; and white bars, those of nudging both concurrently.
We control for grade fixed effects. P-values shown in dark brackets.
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Figure B3. Heterogeneous treatment effects of monitoring on proxy dropouts, by
baseline teacher absenteeism
Note: Proxy dropouts equal to 0 if the participant surveyed at baseline was successfully tracked at end
line, and 1 otherwise. Teacher absenteeism stands for the share of days on which teachers were absent
from the classroom over the 2 weeks prior to the survey, according to students. Median of teachers’
baseline absenteeism is 9.52%. We control for baseline students’ characteristics and grade fixed effects.
Baseline characteristics consist in child gender; standardized baseline grades (numeracy and literacy);
standardized parental engagement; standardized student effort; standardized child labor; standardized
socio-emotional skills; standardized working memory; standardized visual attention; standardized impul-
sivity; standardized self-esteem; standardized mindset. Dark grey bars stand for treatment effect sizes of
nudging parents independently; light grey bars, those of nudging teachers independently; and white bars,
those of nudging both concurrently. We control for grade fixed effects. P-values shown in dark brackets.
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Online Appendix C - Instrumental Variables
This Appendix accounts for imperfect compliance with the interventions by es-
timating an instrumental variables’ model. We show results for survey outcomes
and individual-level data on student dropouts. In our end-line survey, parents
and teachers were asked whether they received text messages from the school
over the course of the school year. We use that binary indicator as a measure
of compliance within the treatment group, and rely on treatment assignment as
an instrument to estimate the ‘clinical’ effects of the interventions – the expected
differences between the treatment and control groups if all subjects assigned to
the interventions had been reached by the nudges. In computing the measure of
compliance, we disregard survey answers by control group participants as schools
often reach out to parents for reasons unrelated to our interventions. For that
reason, our IV estimates likely provide lower bounds for the true treatment ef-
fects on the treated (as we over-estimate the share of compliers in the treatment
group). Table C1 reports IV estimates. Results are very similar to the patterns
documented in the main text, only more precisely estimated.
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Table C1—Instrumental variables estimates for treatment effects on proxy




Parents -0.5770*** -0.0196 -0.3247
(0.0657) (0.0167) (0.2521)
Teachers -0.3581*** 0.0025 -1.0168***
(0.0436) (0.0106) (0.3061)
Both -0.2431*** 0.0349 -0.5169**
(0.0407) (0.0250) (0.2340)
Control group mean 0.1968 0.0908 -0.1644
Parents = Both [p-value] 0.0000 0.0528 0.4740
Teachers = Both [p-value] 0.0348 0.2438 0.0855
Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls Yes Yes No
Weights No Yes No
Observations 2,475 1,845 180
R-squared 0.0030 0.0331
Note: Parents = 1 if parents answered ”yes” to the question ”In the last months, did you receive regular
messages by phone concerning parenting and your child’s education?” at end line, and 0 otherwise;
Teachers = 1 if teachers answered ”yes” to the question ”In the last months, did you receive regular
messages by phone by your school or by Movva?” at end line, and 0 otherwise; and Both = 1 in schools
where both parents and teachers answered ”yes” to these questions, and 0 otherwise. Effect sizes are
reported for treatment-on-treated estimates by instrumenting for individuals who actually received the
treatment using assignment to treatment as instrument. In column (1), the dependent variable equal
to 0 if the participant surveyed at baseline was successfully tracked at end line, and 1 otherwise. We
control for grade fixed effects and baseline students’ characteristics in this column. In column (2), teacher
absenteeism stands for the share of days on which teachers were absent from the classroom over the two
weeks prior to the survey, according to students. In column (3), the dependent variable is the standardized
value of teacher-reported willingness to invest time in professional development weekly, collected in the
follow-up. In column (2), we use end-line data only and control for grade fixed effects, baseline students’
characteristics, and for the predicted probability of students to be tracked at end line (as well as the square
and cubic terms of this variable), predicted using a logistic regression of a dummy indicating tracking
at end line on baseline students’ characteristics in the control group. Baseline characteristics consist in
grade level; child gender; standardized baseline grades (numeracy and literacy); standardized parental
engagement; standardized student effort; standardized child labor; standardized socio-emotional skills;
standardized working memory; standardized visual attention; standardized impulsivity; standardized
self-esteem; standardized mindset. Standard errors clustered at the classroom level in parentheses. *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Online Appendix D - Matching
This Appendix compiles the details of the propensity score matching procedure,
and shows that results in the main text are robust to matching observations
based on their baseline characteristics through a non-parametric, nearest-neighbor
algorithm. Table D1 reports estimates from a logistic regression with dependent
variable equal to 1 if the participant surveyed at baseline was also present at end
line, and 0 otherwise, regressed on baseline student characteristics, restricting
the sample to those in control schools. These estimates are then used to predict
propensity scores for each observation in the whole sample. The remainder of
this Appendix then reproduces the results of the tables and figures that rely on
end-line survey data, using a nearest-neighbour matching algorithm to handle
selective attrition instead. In those estimates, each observation (in each of the
treatment cell) is matched with its closest match in the control group, based on
its predicted propensity score.
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D1. Propensity score estimation
Table D1—Propensity score’s estimation










Std. parental engagement 0.2070
(0.1294)
Std. student effort 0.2118
(0.2359)




Std. working memory -0.0812
(0.3032)









Note: Logistic regression model with dependent variable equal to 1 if the participant surveyed at baseline
was also present at end line, and 0 otherwise. Independent variables are observed baseline students’
characteristics. The sample is restricted to the control group. Standard error clustered at the classroom
level. Significance levels are denoted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table D2—Nearest-neighbor matching strategy for manipulation checks
Parent recalls receiving messages
Text+audio Text only Audio only
(1) (2) (3)
Parents 0.3486*** 0.3362*** 0.3547***
(0.0328) (0.0412) (0.0400)
Teachers -0.0278 -0.0285 -0.0210
(0.0290) (0.0282) (0.0289)
Both 0.2956*** 0.2357*** 0.3688***
(0.0368) (0.0422) (0.0510)
Control group mean 0.1764
Parents = Both [p-value] 0.1739 0.0441 0.8129
Teachers = Both [p-value] 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Matching group Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,119 1,609 1,577
R-squared 0.3840 0.4248 0.4530
Note: Parents = 1 in schools where only parents are nudged, and 0 otherwise; Teachers = 1 in schools
where only teachers are nudged, and 0 otherwise; and Both = 1 in schools where both parents and
teachers are nudged, and 0 otherwise. In column (1), the outcome variable is a dummy equal to 1
if the caregiver recalled receiving text- or audio-messages on her/his phone in the previous year when
we surveyed her/him at end line, and 0 otherwise; in columns (2) and (3), we use the same outcome
but restrict our analyses to the sub-sample of parents who received text-messages on their phone in
column (2), and to those who received audio-messages on their phone in column (3). We control for
baseline students’ characteristics, grade fixed effects, and matching group fixed effects. To control for
selective attrition, we use a nearest-neighbor matching strategy in all columns, where each observation
in the control sub-sample is matched with the closest observation in each of the treatment groups based
on the predicted probability of students to be tracked at end line, predicted using a logistic regression
of a dummy indicating tracking at end line on baseline students’ characteristics in the control group.
The sample is restricted to students who were tracked at end line. Baseline characteristics consist in
child gender; standardized baseline grades (numeracy and literacy); standardized parental engagement;
standardized student effort; standardized child labor; standardized socio-emotional skills; standardized
working memory; standardized visual attention; standardized impulsivity; standardized self-esteem; stan-
dardized mindset. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the classroom level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
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Parents -0.0080 -0.0268 0.0084
(0.0087) (0.0170) (0.0149)
Teachers 0.0037 -0.0132 0.0045
(0.0081) (0.0171) (0.0135)
Both 0.0238** 0.0255 0.0118
(0.0112) (0.0228) (0.0145)
Control group mean 0.0927 0.1081 0.0804
Parents = Both [p-value] 0.0053 0.0273 0.8444
Teachers = Both [p-value] 0.0723 0.0980 0.6293
Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Matching group Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,886 949 937
R-squared 0.3196 0.5451 0.5069
Note: Parents = 1 in schools where only parents are nudged, and 0 otherwise; Teachers = 1 in schools
where only teachers are nudged, and 0 otherwise; and Both = 1 in schools where both parents and teach-
ers are nudged, and 0 otherwise. Teacher absenteeism stands for the share of days on which teachers
were absent from the classroom over the two weeks prior to the survey, according to students. Median of
teachers’ baseline absenteeism is 9.52%. We use end-line data only and control for baseline students’ char-
acteristics, grade fixed effects, and matching group fixed effects. To control for selective attrition, we use
a nearest-neighbor matching strategy in all columns, where each observation in the control sub-sample is
matched with the closest observation in each of the treatment groups based on the predicted probability
of students to be tracked at end line, predicted using a logistic regression of a dummy indicating tracking
at end line on baseline students’ characteristics in the control group. Baseline characteristics consist in
child gender; standardized baseline grades (numeracy and literacy); standardized parental engagement;
standardized student effort; standardized child labor; standardized socio-emotional skills; standardized
working memory; standardized visual attention; standardized impulsivity; standardized self-esteem; stan-
dardized mindset. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the classroom level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parents 0.1275** -0.0215 0.0049 0.0082
(0.0607) (0.0551) (0.0523) (0.0539)
Teachers 0.0247 -0.0940* 0.0266 -0.0057
(0.0577) (0.0526) (0.0564) (0.0553)
Both -0.0671 0.0095 -0.0303 0.0079
(0.0579) (0.0555) (0.0538) (0.0500)
Parents = Both [p-value] 0.0006 0.6008 0.4906 0. 9949
Teachers = Both [p-value] 0.0866 0.0697 0.3046 0.7852
Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matching group Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,119 2,119 2,119 2,119
R-squared 0.2920 0.2802 0.3575 0.3186
Note: Parents = 1 in schools where only parents are nudged, and 0 otherwise; Teachers = 1 in schools
where only teachers are nudged, and 0 otherwise; and Both = 1 in schools where both parents and teach-
ers are nudged, and 0 otherwise. In column (1), the outcome variable is constructed from the following
individual components asked to parents: frequency at which parents participate in school meetings; and
frequency at which parents talk to teacher. In column (2), the outcome variable is constructed from the
following individual components asked to parents: frequency at which parents help with homework; fre-
quency at which parents help organize school material. In column (3), the outcome variable is constructed
from the following individual components asked to parents: frequency at which parents incentivize school
attendance; frequency at which parents incentivize studying. In column (4), the outcome variable is con-
structed from the following individual components asked to parents: frequency at which parents ask
about homework; frequency at which parents ask about school grades; frequency at which parents ask
how school was. For all outcomes, we follow Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007) by standardizing each
component within grade (normalizing by their mean and standard deviation among the control group)
and then averaging across them in order to construct the variable. We use end-line data only and control
for baseline students’ characteristics, grade fixed effects, and matching group fixed effects. To control for
selective attrition, we use a nearest-neighbor matching strategy in all columns, where each observation
in the control sub-sample is matched with the closest observation in each of the treatment groups based
on the predicted probability of students to be tracked at end line, predicted using a logistic regression
of a dummy indicating tracking at end line on baseline students’ characteristics in the control group.
Baseline characteristics consist in child gender; standardized baseline grades (numeracy and literacy);
standardized parental engagement; standardized student effort; standardized child labor; standardized
socio-emotional skills; standardized working memory; standardized visual attention; standardized impul-
sivity; standardized self-esteem; standardized mindset. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the
classroom level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table D5—Nearest-neighbor matching strategy for treatment effects on disciplin-
ing strategies
Components
Summary Without Physical Psychological
measure violence violence violence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parents -0.0090 0.0964** 0.0460 0.0234
(0.0248) (0.0436) (0.0434) (0.0553)
Teachers -0.0163 0.0608 0.0188 -0.0069
(0.0263) (0.0465) (0.0538) (0.0548)
Both 0.0365 -0.0423 0.0151 0.0520
(0.0253) (0.0435) (0.0475) (0.0542)
Parents = Both [p-value] 0.0775 0.0013 0.4946 0.5864
Teachers = Both [p-value] 0.0511 0.0227 0.9462 0.2540
Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matching group Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,119 2,119 2,119 2,119
R-squared 0.2827 0.2810 0.2953 0.2569
Note: Parents = 1 in schools where only parents are nudged, and 0 otherwise; Teachers = 1 in schools
where only teachers are nudged, and 0 otherwise; and Both = 1 in schools where both parents and teachers
are nudged, and 0 otherwise. In column (1), the outcome averages across the outcomes of columns (2) to
(4) (with the outcome of col. (1) set to negative). In column (2), the outcome variable is constructed from
the following individual components asked to caregivers: whether someone in the household took away
privileges, forbade something the child likes (e.g., watching TV, playing with friends) or did not allow the
child to leave the house in the past month; whether someone in the household explained why the child’s
behavior was wrong in the past month; whether someone in the household gave the child something else
to do in the past month. In column (3), the outcome variable is constructed from the following individual
components asked to caregivers: whether someone in the household shook the child in the past month;
whether someone in the household hit or spanked the child with bare hand in the past month; whether
someone in the household spanked the child or hit him/her elsewhere on the body with something like a
belt, hairbrush, stick or other hard object in the past month; whether someone in the household hit or
slapped the child on the face, head or ears in the past month; whether someone in the household hit or
slapped the child on the hand, arm, or leg in the past month; whether someone in the household beat the
child up, that is hit him/her over and over as hard as one could in the past month; whether the caregiver
believes that in order to bring up, raise, or educate a child properly, the child needs to be physically
punished. In column (4), the outcome variable is constructed from the following individual components
asked to caregivers: whether someone in the household shouted, yelled at or screamed at the child in the
past month; whether someone in the household called the child dumb, lazy, or another name like that
in the past month. For all outcomes, we follow Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007) by standardizing each
component within grade (normalizing by their mean and standard deviation among the control group)
and then averaging across them in order to construct the variable. We use end-line data only and control
for baseline students’ characteristics, grade fixed effects, and matching group fixed effects. To control for
selective attrition, we use a nearest-neighbor matching strategy in all columns, where each observation
in the control sub-sample is matched with the closest observation in each of the treatment groups based
on the predicted probability of students to be tracked at end line, predicted using a logistic regression
of a dummy indicating tracking at end line on baseline students’ characteristics in the control group.
Baseline characteristics consist in child gender; standardized baseline grades (numeracy and literacy);
standardized parental engagement; standardized student effort; standardized child labor; standardized
socio-emotional skills; standardized working memory; standardized visual attention; standardized impul-
sivity; standardized self-esteem; standardized mindset. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the
classroom level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table D6—Nearest-neighbor matching strategy for treatment effects on parental
beliefs, student effort, and learning
Components
Test scores
Parents’ Student summary Numeracy Literacy
beliefs effort measure (std.) (std.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Parents -0.0583 0.0574 0.0675* 0.0675* 0.0674
(0.0616) (0.0445) (0.0388) (0.0376) (0.0471)
Teachers -0.1158** 0.0546 -0.0279 0.0048 -0.0606
(0.0542) (0.0423) (0.0353) (0.0340) (0.0458)
Both -0.2357*** 0.0409 -0.0150 -0.0056 -0.0244
(0.0629) (0.0391) (0.0340) (0.0355) (0.0411)
Parents = Both [p-value] 0.0079 0.6614 0.0255 0.0496 0.0422
Teachers = Both [p-value] 0.0405 0.6890 0.7028 0.7629 0.4124
Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matching group Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,960 2,180 2,180 2,180 2,180
R-squared 0.3251 0.3237 0.6753 0.6142 0.6441
Note: Parents = 1 in schools where only parents are nudged, and 0 otherwise; Teachers = 1 in schools
where only teachers are nudged, and 0 otherwise; and Both = 1 in schools where both parents and teach-
ers are nudged, and 0 otherwise. In column (1), the outcome variable is constructed from the following
individual components asked to caregivers: parental beliefs about performance in mathematics; parental
beliefs about performance in French; parental beliefs about overall school performance; parental beliefs
about future school performance. In column (2), the outcome variable is a summary measure constructed
from the following individual components asked to students, equal to 1 if answer is sometimes or more
more often, and 0 otherwise: whether they study at home on a general weekday; whether they listen to
the radio on a general weekday; whether they read a book, a newspaper or magazines on a general week-
day. In column (3), the outcome variable is a summary measure constructed from individual components
consisting in mathematics exercises completed by students. In column (4), the outcome variable is a
summary measure constructed from individual components consisting in French exercises completed by
students. In column (5), the summary measure averages across numeracy and literacy standardized test
scores. For all outcomes, we follow Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007) by standardizing each component
within grade (normalizing by their mean and standard deviation among the control group) and then
averaging across them in order to construct the variable. We use end-line data only and control for
baseline students’ characteristics, grade fixed effects, and matching group fixed effects. To control for
selective attrition, we use a nearest-neighbor matching strategy in all columns, where each observation
in the control sub-sample is matched with the closest observation in each of the treatment groups based
on the predicted probability of students to be tracked at end line, predicted using a logistic regression
of a dummy indicating tracking at end line on baseline students’ characteristics in the control group.
Baseline characteristics consist in child gender; standardized baseline grades (numeracy and literacy);
standardized parental engagement; standardized student effort; standardized child labor; standardized
socio-emotional skills; standardized working memory; standardized visual attention; standardized impul-
sivity; standardized self-esteem; standardized mindset. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the
classroom level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Figure D1. Nearest-neighbor matching strategy for heterogeneous treatment ef-
fects of monitoring on teacher absenteeism, by baseline teacher motivation
Note: Teacher absenteeism stands for the share of days on which teachers were absent from the class-
room over the two weeks prior to the survey, according to students. Teachers’ motivation is constructed
following Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007) by standardizing each motivation component within grade
(normalizing by their mean and standard deviation among the control group) and then averaging across
them in order to construct the variable. We use end-line data only and control for baseline students’ char-
acteristics, grade fixed effects, and matching group fixed effects. To control for selective attrition, we use
a nearest-neighbor matching strategy in all columns, where each observation in the control sub-sample is
matched with the closest observation in each of the treatment groups based on the predicted probability
of students to be tracked at end line, predicted using a logistic regression of a dummy indicating tracking
at end line on baseline students’ characteristics in the control group. Baseline characteristics consist in
child gender; standardized baseline grades (numeracy and literacy); standardized parental engagement;
standardized student effort; standardized child labor; standardized socio-emotional skills; standardized
working memory; standardized visual attention; standardized impulsivity; standardized self-esteem; stan-
dardized mindset. Dark grey bars stand for treatment effect sizes of nudging parents independently; light
grey bars, those of nudging teachers independently; and white bars, those of nudging both concurrently.
P-values shown in dark brackets.
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Figure D2. Nearest-neighbor matching strategy for heterogeneous treatment ef-
fects of monitoring on teacher absenteeism, by audio vs text messages
Note: Teacher absenteeism stands for the share of days on which teachers were absent from the classroom
over the two weeks prior to the survey, according to students. We use end-line data only and control for
baseline students’ characteristics, grade fixed effects, and matching group fixed effects. To control for
selective attrition, we use a nearest-neighbor matching strategy in all columns, where each observation
in the control sub-sample is matched with the closest observation in each of the treatment groups based
on the predicted probability of students to be tracked at end line, predicted using a logistic regression
of a dummy indicating tracking at end line on baseline students’ characteristics in the control group.
Baseline characteristics consist in child gender; standardized baseline grades (numeracy and literacy);
standardized parental engagement; standardized student effort; standardized child labor; standardized
socio-emotional skills; standardized working memory; standardized visual attention; standardized impul-
sivity; standardized self-esteem; standardized mindset. Dark grey bars stand for treatment effect sizes
of nudging parents independently; light grey bars, those of nudging teachers independently; and white
bars, those of nudging both concurrently. P-values shown in dark brackets.
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Online Appendix E - Teachers’ selective non-response
Treatment assignment is systematically correlated with non-response at our
follow-up survey with teachers, but we do not have baseline characteristics for all
of them since this was when CM2 teachers were surveyed for the first time. For
this reason, this Appendix computes bounds for treatment effects on outcomes
based on follow-up survey data. We follow Lee (2009)’s bounding procedure,
trimming observations under extreme assumptions for the nature of selection to
equalize response rates across treatment arms. Table E1 reports the results,
showing that our estimates are not sensitive to teachers’ selective non-response
at the additional follow-up survey.
Table E1—Lee Bounds for treatment effects on monitoring and teachers’ time use
Selective Teacher reports Professional
non-response parents show up development
Lower Upper Lower Upper
bound bound bound bound
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Parents 0.0016 0.0038 0.2208 -0.5815 0.0253
(0.0441)
Teachers 0.1081** -0.0982 0.0947 -0.9382 -0.1729
(0.0435)
Both 0.0370 0.0158 0.2320 -0.9189 -0.2616
(0.0429)
Control group mean 0.0139 0.0981 0.1232 0.1121 0.1177
Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 296
R-squared 0.0468
Note: Parents = 1 in schools where only parents are nudged, and 0 otherwise; Teachers = 1 in schools
where only teachers are nudged, and 0 otherwise; and Both = 1 in schools where both parents and
teachers are nudged, and 0 otherwise. In column (1), the outcome is a dummy variable where dependent
variable = 1 if we had no answer for that teacher in the additional follow-up follow-up survey, and 0
otherwise. In columns (2) to (4), we report the upper and lower limits of the 90% confidence interval of
respectively the upper and lower bounds computed following Lee (2009). Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Online Appendix F - Additional Robustness Checks
This Appendix presents additional robustness checks for the main results of the
paper. As discussed in the main text, our classroom-level measures of student
dropouts and grade repetitions are imperfect because we cannot account for stu-
dent transfers across schools. In particular, this leads those measures to assume
negative values in a few instances. Table F1 shows that our estimates for treat-
ment effects on student dropouts and grade repetition using administrative data
are robust to setting negative values to 0. The remainder of the Appendix repro-
duces our estimates of treatment effects in the main text but clustering standard
errors at the school level instead.
Table F1—Treatment effects on student dropout and grade repetition
Components
Summary Dropout Grade rep.
measure rate rate
(1) (2) (3)
Parents -0.1788* -0.0182** -0.0086
(0.1063) (0.0088) (0.0198)
Teachers -0.1001 -0.0195** 0.0148
(0.1048) (0.0087) (0.0195)
Both -0.0217 -0.0030 0.0005
(0.1035) (0.0086) (0.0193)
Control group mean 0.0000 0.0468 0.1527
Parents = Both [p-value] 0.1357 0.0810 0.6397
Teachers = Both [p-value] 0.4493 0.0550 0.4596
Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 296 296 296
R-squared 0.0320 0.0376 0.0169
Note: Parents = 1 in schools where only parents are nudged, and 0 otherwise; Teachers = 1 in schools
where only teachers are nudged, and 0 otherwise; and Both = 1 in schools where both parents and teachers
are nudged, and 0 otherwise. Data are from administrative records, corrected by setting to 0 the negative
values of dropout (9 values) and grade repetition rate (3 values). In column (1), following Kling, Liebman
and Katz (2007), the summary measure averages across index components, each normalized by control
group mean and standard deviation; in columns (2) and (3), index components are dropout rate (col.
2) and grade repetition rate (col. 3) at the classroom level, corrected by setting negative values to 0.
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table F2—Treatment effects on student dropouts and grade repetition with stan-
dard errors clustered at the school level
Components
Summary Dropout Grade rep.
measure rate rate
(1) (2) (3)
Parents -0.2393 -0.0248** -0.0107
(0.1463) (0.0114) (0.0242)
Teachers -0.1225 -0.0223** 0.0148
(0.1325) (0.0100) (0.0213)
Both -0.0428 -0.0031 -0.0047
(0.1388) (0.0107) (0.0244)
Control group mean 0.0000 0.0468 0.1527
Parents = Both [p-value] 0.1102 0.0329 0.7972
Teachers = Both [p-value] 0.4496 0.0237 0.3395
Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 296 296 296
R-squared 0.0353 0.0462 0.0151
Note: Parents = 1 in schools where only parents are nudged, and 0 otherwise; Teachers = 1 in schools
where only teachers are nudged, and 0 otherwise; and Both = 1 in schools where both parents and teachers
are nudged, and 0 otherwise. Data are from administrative records. In column (1), following Kling,
Liebman and Katz (2007), the summary measure averages across index components, each normalized
by control group mean and standard deviation; in columns (2) and (3), index components are dropout
rate (col. (2)) and grade repetition rate (col. (3)) at the classroom level. Standard errors in parentheses
clustered at the school level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table F3—Treatment effects on teacher absenteeism and time use with standard
errors clustered at the school level
Teacher absenteeism
All Above- Below- Professional
teachers median median development
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parents -0.0080 -0.0253* 0.0051 -0.2772
(0.0093) (0.0130) (0.0113) (0.2167)
Teachers 0.0032 -0.0004 0.0042 -0.6219***
(0.0097) (0.0138) (0.0109) (0.1906)
Both 0.0191 0.0252 0.0070 -0.5885***
(0.0130) (0.0199) (0.0126) (0.2097)
Control group mean 0.0927 0.1081 0.0804 0.0000
Parents = Both [p-value] 0.0433 0.0169 0.8865 0.2048
Teachers = Both [p-value] 0.2506 0.2190 0.8281 0.8807
Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes No
Predicted propensity scores Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 1,940 949 991 273
R-squared 0.0137 0.0369 0.0194 0.0659
Note: Parents = 1 in schools where only parents are nudged, and 0 otherwise; Teachers = 1 in schools
where only teachers are nudged, and 0 otherwise; and Both = 1 in schools where both parents and teach-
ers are nudged, and 0 otherwise. In columns (1) to (3), teacher absenteeism stands for the share of days
on which teachers were absent from the classroom over the two weeks prior to the survey, according to
students. In column (4), the dependent variable is the standardized value of teacher-reported willingness
to invest time in professional development weekly, collected in the follow-up. In columns (1) to (3), we
use end-line data only and control for baseline students’ characteristics, grade fixed effects and for the
predicted probability of being tracked at end line (as well as the square and cubic terms of this variable),
predicted using a logistic regression of a dummy indicating tracking at end line on baseline students’ char-
acteristics in the control group. Baseline characteristics consist in child gender; standardized baseline
grades (numeracy and literacy); standardized parental engagement; standardized student effort; stan-
dardized child labor; standardized socio-emotional skills; standardized working memory; standardized
visual attention; standardized impulsivity; standardized self-esteem; standardized mindset. Standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at the school level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Online Appendix G - Additional Results
This Appendix compiles additional tables and figures to complement the analy-
ses presented in the main text. Figure G1 displays histograms for the distribution
of teacher absenteeism at baseline and end line (the latter, only for the control
group), based on students’ survey responses at each point in time and averaged
at the classroom level. While median teacher absenteeism is quite low in our
sample (below 10%), likely because our surveys took place at the very beginning
and at the very end of the school year, at baseline the distribution is more spread
out, with some teachers absent as much as 50% of the time.The remainder of the
Appendix estimates heterogeneous treatment effects by grade and gender.
Figure G1. Histogram of teacher absenteeism
Note: Histogram of teacher absenteeism at the classroom level. Teacher absenteeism stands for the share
of days on which teachers were absent from the classroom over the 2 weeks prior to the survey, according
to students.
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G1. Heterogeneous treatment effects by grade








Parents -0.0917 -0.0147 0.0068
(0.2258) (0.0153) (0.0267)
Teachers 0.1668 -0.0086 0.0405
(0.2235) (0.0151) (0.0264)
Both 0.1385 -0.0017 0.0255
(0.2214) (0.0150) (0.0261)
Control group mean 0.0000 0.0458 0.1358
Parents = Both [p-value] 0.3060 0.3928 0.4819
Teachers = Both [p-value] 0.8988 0.6453 0.5659
Baseline controls No No No
Observations 100 100 100
R-squared 0.0178 0.0121 0.0293
Note: Parents = 1 in schools where only parents are nudged, and 0 otherwise; Teachers = 1 in schools
where only teachers are nudged, and 0 otherwise; and Both = 1 in schools where both parents and teachers
are nudged, and 0 otherwise. The sample is restricted to CP2 students. In column (1), following Kling,
Liebman and Katz (2007), the summary measure averages across index components, each normalized by
control group mean and standard deviation; in columns (2) and (3), index components are rates at the
classroom level. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Parents -0.2502 -0.0286 0.0081
(0.2272) (0.0177) (0.0346)
Teachers -0.1979 -0.0270 0.0166
(0.2249) (0.0175) (0.0343)
Both -0.2711 -0.0038 -0.0535
(0.2227) (0.0173) (0.0339)
Control group mean 0.0000 0.0515 0.1739
Parents = Both [p-value] 0.9264 0.1598 0.0754
Teachers = Both [p-value] 0.7433 0.1830 0.0416
Baseline controls No No No
Observations 100 100 100
R-squared 0.0186 0.0441 0.0517
Note: Parents = 1 in schools where only parents are nudged, and 0 otherwise; Teachers = 1 in schools
where only teachers are nudged, and 0 otherwise; and Both = 1 in schools where both parents and teachers
are nudged, and 0 otherwise. The sample is restricted to CE2 students. In column (1), following Kling,
Liebman and Katz (2007), the summary measure averages across index components, each normalized by
control group mean and standard deviation; in columns (2) and (3), index components are rates at the
classroom level. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Parents -0.3317** -0.0316* -0.0498
(0.1555) (0.0166) (0.0442)
Teachers -0.2340 -0.0318* -0.0138
(0.1521) (0.0163) (0.0433)
Both 0.0122 -0.0041 0.0136
(0.1492) (0.0159) (0.0424)
Control group mean 0.0000 0.0428 0.1481
Parents = Both [p-value] 0.0266 0.0948 0.1478
Teachers = Both [p-value] 0.1021 0.0859 0.5194
Observations 96 96 96
R-squared 0.0755 0.0676 0.0245
Note: Parents = 1 in schools where only parents are nudged, and 0 otherwise; Teachers = 1 in schools
where only teachers are nudged, and 0 otherwise; and Both = 1 in schools where both parents and teachers
are nudged, and 0 otherwise. The sample is restricted to CM2 students. In column (1), following Kling,
Liebman and Katz (2007), the summary measure averages across index components, each normalized by
control group mean and standard deviation; in columns (2) and (3), index components are rates at the
classroom level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table G4—Teacher absenteeism and time use for CP2, CE2 and CM2 students
Teacher absenteeism Professional development
CP2 CE2 CP2 CE2 CM2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Parents -0.0081 -0.0089 -0.7505** 0.1201 -0.1848
(0.0116) (0.0127) (0.3301) (0.3791) (0.3340)
Teachers 0.0048 0.0002 -0.8286** -0.8926** -0.1885
(0.0109) (0.0139) (0.3425) (0.3886) (0.3302)
Both 0.0260 0.0094 -0.7457** -0.3602 -0.6521**
(0.0191) (0.0152) (0.3233) (0.3748) (0.3266)
Control group mean 0.0910 0.0945 0.1005 -0.2497 0.1388
Parents = Both [p-value] 0.0891 0.1917 0.9883 0.2086 0.1652
Teachers = Both [p-value] 0.2863 0.5435 0.8077 0.1744 0.1637
Baseline controls Yes Yes No No No
Predicted propensity scores Yes Yes No No No
Observations 975 965 92 88 93
R-squared 0.0248 0.0169 0.0864 0.0872 0.0465
Note: Parents = 1 in schools where only parents are nudged, and 0 otherwise; Teachers = 1 in schools
where only teachers are nudged, and 0 otherwise; and Both = 1 in schools where both parents and teach-
ers are nudged, and 0 otherwise. In columns (1) and (3), the sample is restricted to CP2 students. In
columns (2) and (4), the sample is restricted to CE2 students. In column (5), the sample is restricted to
CM2 students. In columns (1) and (2), teacher absenteeism stands for the share of days on which teachers
were absent from the classroom over the two weeks prior to the survey, according to students. In columns
(3) to (5), the dependent variable is the standardized value of teacher-reported willingness to invest time
in professional development weekly, collected in the follow-up. In columns (1) and (2), we use end-line
data only and control for baseline students’ characteristics, grade fixed effects and for the predicted
probability of students to be tracked at end line (as well as the square and cubic terms of this variable),
predicted using a logistic regression of a dummy indicating tracking at end line on baseline students’ char-
acteristics in the control group. Baseline characteristics consist in child gender; standardized baseline
grades (numeracy and literacy); standardized parental engagement; standardized student effort; stan-
dardized child labor; standardized socio-emotional skills; standardized working memory; standardized
visual attention; standardized impulsivity; standardized self-esteem; standardized mindset. Standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at the classroom level in column (1) and (2). * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
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G2. Heterogeneous treatment effects by gender











Control group mean 0.1145 0.1263
Parents = Both [p-value] 0.8261 0.7936
Teachers = Both [p-value] 0.4367 0.7232
[Boys]Parents = [Girls]Parents [p-value] 0.3691
[Boys]Teachers = [Girls]Teachers [p-value] 0.1134
[Boys]Both = [Girls]Both [p-value] 0.3476
Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Baseline controls Yes Yes
Observations 1,237 1,238
R-squared 0.0081 0.0172
Note: Parents = 1 in schools where only parents are nudged, and 0 otherwise; Teachers = 1 in schools
where only teachers are nudged, and 0 otherwise; and Both = 1 in schools where both parents and teachers
are nudged, and 0 otherwise. In column (1), the sample is restricted to boys, while it’s restricted to girls
in column (2). The dependent variable equal to 0 if the participant surveyed at baseline was successfully
tracked at end line, and 1 otherwise. We control for grade fixed effects and baseline students’ character-
istics, which consist in child gender; standardized baseline grades (numeracy and literacy); standardized
parental engagement; standardized student effort; standardized child labor; standardized socio-emotional
skills; standardized working memory; standardized visual attention; standardized impulsivity; standard-
ized self-esteem; standardized mindset. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the classroom level.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table G6—Teacher absenteeism and time use by gender
Teacher absenteeism Professional development
Male Female Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parents -0.0094 -0.0072 -0.1741 -0.6736
(0.0102) (0.0152) (0.2760) (0.5063)
Teachers 0.0084 0.0016 -0.8775*** -0.7573
(0.0118) (0.0121) (0.2999) (0.4868)
Both 0.0068 0.0328* -0.4502 -0.5541
(0.0142) (0.0192) (0.3033) (0.4425)
Control group mean 0.0920 0.0946 -0.0146 -0.1910
Parents = Both [p-value] 0.2376 0.0626 0.3680 0.7932
Teachers = Both [p-value] 0.9141 0.0955 0.1942 0.6351
[Male]Parents=[Female]Parents [p-value] 0.9081 0.3846
[Male]Teachers=[Female]Teachers [p-value] 0.4597 0.8362
[Male]Both=[Female]Both [p-value] 0.2918 0.8476
Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls Yes Yes No No
Predicted propensity scores Yes Yes No No
Observations 1,177 763 108 72
R-squared 0.0189 0.0470 0.0846 0.0518
Note: Parents = 1 in schools where only parents are nudged, and 0 otherwise; Teachers = 1 in schools
where only teachers are nudged, and 0 otherwise; and Both = 1 in schools where both parents and teachers
are nudged, and 0 otherwise. In columns (1) and (3), the sample is restricted to male teachers. In columns
(2) and (4), the sample is restricted to female teachers. In columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is
the standardized value of teacher-reported willingness to invest time in professional development weekly,
collected in the follow-up. In columns (1) and (2), teacher absenteeism stands for the share of days
on which teachers were absent from the classroom over the two weeks prior to the survey, according
to students, and we use end-line data only and control for baseline students’ characteristics, grade
fixed effects and for the predicted probability of students to be tracked at end line (as well as the
square and cubic terms of this variable), predicted using a logistic regression of a dummy indicating
tracking at end line on baseline students’ characteristics in the control group. Baseline characteristics
consist in child gender; standardized baseline grades (numeracy and literacy); standardized parental
engagement; standardized student effort; standardized child labor; standardized socio-emotional skills;
standardized working memory; standardized visual attention; standardized impulsivity; standardized
self-esteem; standardized mindset. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the classroom level in
column (1) and (2). Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the classroom level in columns (1) and
(2). * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table G7—Treatment effects on test scores by gender
Summary measure Numeracy (std.) Literacy (std.)
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parents 0.0974** 0.0350 0.1110** 0.0281 0.0838 0.0418
(0.0488) (0.0515) (0.0490) (0.0517) (0.0583) (0.0619)
Teachers 0.0201 -0.0916** 0.0685 -0.0756 -0.0282 -0.1076**
(0.0422) (0.0451) (0.0448) (0.0480) (0.0531) (0.0544)
Both 0.0237 -0.0573 0.0232 -0.0238 0.0243 -0.0909*
(0.0414) (0.0449) (0.0454) (0.0497) (0.0485) (0.0516)
Control group mean 0.1085 0.1754 0.1308 0.1524 0.0862 0.1983
Parents = Both [p-value] 0.1217 0.0372 0.0773 0.2815 0.2847 0.0130
Teachers = Both [p-value] 0.9290 0.3487 0.3154 0.2402 0.2908 0.7032
[Male]Parents=[Female]Parents [p-value] 0.2450 0.1539 0.5207
[Male]Teachers=[Female]Teachers [p-value] 0.0206 0.0075 0.1959
[Male]Both=[Female]Both [p-value] 0.0987 0.4048 0.0458
Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Predicted propensity scores Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,109 1,134 1,109 1,134 1,109 1,134
R-squared 0.5688 0.5815 0.4863 0.4859 0.5343 0.5414
Note: Parents = 1 in schools where only parents are nudged, and 0 otherwise; Teachers = 1 in schools
where only teachers are nudged, and 0 otherwise; and Both = 1 in schools where both parents and teach-
ers are nudged, and 0 otherwise. In columns (1) and (2), the outcome variable is a summary measure
constructed from individual components consisting in mathematics exercises completed by students. In
columns (3) and (4), the summary measure averages across numeracy and literacy standardized test
scores. In columns (5) and (6), the outcome variable is a summary measure constructed from individ-
ual components consisting in French exercises completed by students. Sample restricted to boys only
in odd columns, and to girls only in even columns. For all outcomes, we follow Kling, Liebman and
Katz (2007) by standardizing each component within grade (normalizing by their mean and standard
deviation among the control group) and then averaging across them in order to construct the variable.
In all columns, we use endline data only and control for baseline students’ characteristics, grade fixed
effects and for the predicted probability of students to be tracked at endline (as well as the square
and cubic terms of this variable), predicted using a logistic regression of a dummy indicating tracking
at endline on baseline students’ characteristics in the control group. Baseline characteristics consist in
child gender; standardized baseline grades (numeracy and literacy); standardized parental engagement;
standardized student effort; standardized child labor; standardized socio-emotional skills; standardized
working memory; standardized visual attention; standardized impulsivity; standardized self-esteem; stan-
dardized mindset. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the classroom level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
78 MONTH YEAR
Online Appendix H - Pre-Analysis Plans
This Appendix compiles our pre-analysis plans in full. At the time of pre-
registration, we concentrated our hypotheses on issues linked to whether the
effects of the intervention evaluated in Bettinger et al. (2020) in Brazil would
be transferable to the Sub-Saharan African context. Subsection H.H1 discusses
the instances in which our analyses deviate from what had been pre-specified, fol-
lowed by subsections H.H2 and H.H3, which present the pre-analysis plans for the
baseline and end-line surveys, and for the additional follow-up wave, respectively.
H1. Deviations from pre-analysis plan
When we started this project, back in 2017, we did not anticipate that nudges
to both parents and teachers would backfire. We were originally interested in
whether nudging parents was enough to improve educational outcomes in this
setting, or whether nudging teachers concurrently was necessary for that. The
motivation for posing this question was two-fold. First, although the same SMS
program had proven effective while nudging parents in Brazil (Bettinger et al.,
2020), teachers are much more likely to be absent in Ivory Coast – potentially
muting the effects of higher parental engagement, given joint production of chil-
dren’s education. Second, a much higher share of parents is illiterate in the latter
– potentially muting the effects of the intervention on parental engagement (also
the reason for why we experimented with audio vs. text messages). Upon learning
about the large positive effects of nudges to parents and the absence of effects of
the joint intervention in our experiment, we decided to look deeper into the data,
and realized that our research design and the specifics of how nudges to parents
had worked in this context allowed us to study a broader and more fundamental
question.
We had pre-specified that we would analyse treatment effects separately by
grade. While in the main paper we concentrate our analysis in the whole sample
to maximize statistical power, Appendix G compiles our main results broken down
by grade. Next, we did not pre-register that we would estimate heterogeneous
treatment effects, splitting the sample by median teacher attendance or median
teacher motivation. Those estimates are, however, used only to shed further light
on the mechanisms behind the main treatment effects – which are all estimated
using analyses registered in the pre-analyis plan. We also did not specify that we
would analyze treatment effects on instruction targeting. That hypothesis only
came to mind after we plotted the distributions of test scores for students whom
we could not track at the end-line survey, and we thought it would be important
to document those effects even though the analysis was not pre-registered.
While we had not originally planned to analyze treatment effects on teachers’
time use, or to elicit parents’ and teachers’ best-response functions, we extended
the pre-analysis plan to register that analyses before the extra follow-up survey
data was collected. Having said that, even this additional pre-analysis plan could
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not anticipate every angle relevant to our research question before we looked
at the data. We highlight two issues in particular. First, we had not specified
how exactly we would control for students’ and teachers’ baseline characteristics
in the analyses. Throughout the paper, we resort to ANCOVA specifications,
rather than student fixed-effects, to maximize our statistical power to detect even
small effect sizes, in instances like test scores. Second, we had not specified
how we would handle selective attrition. Whenever we have access to baseline
characteristics, we use matching techniques (propensity score matching in the
main text, and nearest neighbor matching in Appendix D); otherwise, we bound
treatment effects following Lee (2009).
Treatment effects on pre-registered outcomes not analyzed in this paper are
discussed in Wolf, Lichand and Deambrosi (2020), Finch, Wolf and Lichand (2020)
and Wolf and Lichand (2020).
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Are Parenting Interventions Transferable Across Settings? 
Evaluating Key Constraints in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Pre-analysis Plan 
While evidence from Brazil suggests that SMS messages to nudge parents’ engagement in their 
children’s education have large effects on educational outcomes, such an intervention might not work 
as intended in poorer settings, for at least two reasons: parents have a much higher likelihood of being 
illiterate – such that text-based interventions may fail to induce behavior change –, and teachers 
have less formal training and a much higher probability of being absent from schools – such that 
learning outcomes may not improve even if student’s attendance increases. This paper investigates 
whether those reasons are critical constraints for transferring the intervention across settings, in the 
context of Ivory Coast, by randomly assigning whether parents receive nudges over text or voice 
messages, and by cross-randomizing nudges across parents and teachers.  
I. Introduction 
Both youth and adult literacy rates in Côte d‘Ivoire are low, estimated at 53% and 44%, respectively 
(UNESCO Institute for Statistics, n.d.), with large disparities for marginalized groups, including females 
and poor children. With the goal of improving learning and literacy through universal education, Ivorian 
authorities are employing various strategies as part of reforms to meet this goal. One approach to 
promoting education and learning is to increase parental awareness and engagement in their child’s 
education, known to be key predictors of children’s academic achievement (see Castro et al., 2015 for a 
meta-analysis). To do that, Ivorian authorities plan to test Eduq+, a platform powered by MGov, a 
Brazilian social impact startup, which allows schools to send messages to parents with information about 
children’s attendance and grades, and which nudges them with motivating facts and suggested activities 
to engage them in their children’s school life. The SMS-based version of Eduq+ has been shown to be 
effective in Brazil, where communication with parents had large impacts on attendance, test scores and 
grade promotion rates (Cunha et al., 2017). Nevertheless, in contexts with low adult literacy rates, audio-
based interventions for caregivers may be more effective than text-based.  
Moreover, in the context of Côte d’Ivoire, it is not clear that an increase in students’ attendance rate 
would automatically translate in better learning outcomes. Indeed, a number of previous evaluations of 
children’s literacy and numeracy skills, show that pupils in Côte d’Ivoire perform relatively worse than in 
other developing countries, suggesting that they learn relatively little in school (see for example PASEC, 




from the classroom in Sub-Saharan Africa (Kremer and Holla, 2009), and poor instructional time use 
inside the class. Indeed, a study conducted in Ghana and in the Brazilian state of Pernambuco, found 
that the percentage of time that students were engaged in learning activities was approximately 39% in 
Ghana, compared to 63% in Brazil (Abadzi, H., 2007). 
The program to be tested in Côte d’Ivoire, has two important features that differ from the one previously 
evaluated in Brazil. First, Eduq+ will send messages not only to parents, but also to teachers, with nudges 
to encourage higher attendance and suggested activities on how to implement best practices and 
customize their classes to fit the needs of their students, in order to impact the quality of teaching. 
Moreover, for parents, we will consider the differential impacts of audio-messaging vs. text-messaging, 
as well as which characteristics of children and parents can boost the educational gains from the program 
and why.  
Rather than just comparing average treatment effects of text vs. audio messages, we are interested in 
heterogeneity. Parent’s characteristics – from literacy to language spoken at home to patterns of attention 
– may be critical for determining which type of intervention is most effective for each family. Moreover, 
children’s characteristics may also support or constrain to the success of the intervention, such as that 
parents may be more willing to engage and invest in children with higher baseline academic skills.  
Applying this framework will allow us to understand more about how to foster successful home-school 
relationships, as well as how to tailor behavioral nudge interventions to different children and parents to 
be most effective, with implications for national educational interventions. 
This pre-analysis plan summarizes the design of a field experiment designed to test the following primary 
hypotheses: 
1. Does nudging parents via SMS messages improve academic and behavioral learning outcomes?  
 Hypothesis: Eduq+ (audio or text delivery) improves attendance, grades and promotion rates, 
and decreases school dropout rates. 
 Assuming parental educational investments and school attendance increase, it is not 
clear that children’s learning outcomes will improve. Given low educational quality, 
attending school does not necessarily translate improved learning. This question assesses 
if Eduq+ impacts other dimensions of children’s learning that have potential prospects 
for longer-term well-being. 
2. What delivery mode for SMS nudges to parents has the largest impacts on academic and behavioral 
learning outcomes: text or audio? 
 Hypothesis: Parent’s characteristics are key moderators for the impacts of the program and hence 
determine which delivery mode has higher impacts. We posit that text delivery (SMS) will have 
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larger impacts amongst (a) literate parents who primarily communicate with their children in 
French; (b) parents with relatively higher visual attention vis-à-vis audio attention; and (c) parents 
with relatively higher trust in text vis-à-vis audio messages. 
3. Do text messages to teachers increase the impacts of audio/text messages to parents? 
 Hypothesis: The effects of Eduq+ (audio or text delivery) on attendance, grades and promotion 
rates, and decreases school dropout rates should be higher for children whose teachers also 
receive nudges to boost their motivation and support them with information about best 
practices. 
Besides assessing the impact of the intervention on children’s learning outcomes, and determining the 
most effective delivery mode for nudging parents, we are also interested in testing two additional 
exploratory hypotheses:  
4. How do child characteristics (baseline literacy and numeracy skills, working memory, attention, 
motivation, social-emotional and self-regulatory skills, time use, self-esteem and mindset) moderate 
impacts on (i) changes in parents’ education investments, and (ii) children’s learning outcomes? 
 Hypothesis: Larger impacts on parents’ investments will occur for children who have higher 
levels of academic skills at baseline. Children’s non-cognitive skills will moderate impacts on 
learning outcomes, with children who have higher levels of non-cognitive skills benefiting more 
from the intervention. 
5. Do text messages to teachers improve teachers’ attendance and students’ learning outcomes? 
 Hypothesis: text messages to teachers will increase attendance and time spent on learning 










The intervention, which has been designed and will be implemented by MGov and the Ministry of 
Education of Côte d’Ivoire, will randomly assign students’ parents and teachers to receive messages by 
the schools and by MGov. In particular, parents will be assigned to one of three treatment groups:  
1. An “audio treatment”, in which parents will receive in the form of audio messages: (i) up to one 
message per week sent by school to parents about students’ attendance or performance, and (ii) two 
messages per week sent by MGov, as nudges, where parents will receive suggestions of simple 
activities that aid in social-emotional development, and which do not demand any curricular 
knowledge.  
2. A text treatment in which the same information will be provided in the form of a message over SMS,  
3. A control group, in which parents will not receive any message. 
Additionally, teachers will also be assigned to one of two treatment groups:  
1. A text treatment in which they will receive weekly messages over SMS with tips on activities to do 
with students and way to customize their classes to increase children’s learning,  













III. Experimental Design 
The intervention will be evaluated through a school-randomized control trial with 100 schools in 2 
regions in Côte d’Ivoire. In order to minimize spillovers, randomization will be done at the school level, 
which will be assigned to one of six treatment groups, as shown in table 1. 
Table 1: Randomization strategy 



































(survey data for 324) 
Teachers: 26 
 
We will use administrative data on test scores (if made available), attendance, and drop-out rates, as well 
as primary data collected through surveys with parents, teachers and head teachers, and direct assessments 
with students. Specifically, data collection will occur through: (i) direct child assessments administered in 
schools, with 25 randomly chosen students per school, (ii) surveys with teachers and head teachers 
administered in school, and (iii) directly administered surveys with caregivers in their home. This will 
occur at two time-points: baseline (October 2018 for parents, when assessors will already be going to 
communities for program enrolment, and October 2018 for children and teachers, during the first month 
of school), and follow up (June-July 2019, at the end of the school year).  Finally, we will also administer 
a head-teacher survey at baseline, to assess school characteristics that may serve as barriers or supports 
for the successful implementation of the program. 
IV. Measures 
The questionnaire administered to parents will collect the following data: 
 socio-demographic characteristics such as gender, relationship with the child, age, marital 
status, years as primary caretaker of the child, language spoken at home and education, 
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 Language of instruction skills to assess parents’ ability to comprehend the content of the text 
and audio messages, 
 Trust in audio vs. text messages, 
 Parent’s involvement in their child’s education, 
 Parent self-reported mindset with respect to children (growth or fixed) and failure mindset, 
 Parent’s expectations, aspirations for their child’s education, and beliefs on the child’s school 
performance and attendance, 
 Audio and visual working memory, measured through a simple picture-span task, 
 Audio and visual attention, measured through a simple stroop task, 
 Self-reported hypothetical willingness to pay to receive weekly messages about their child’s 
school life, 
 Parent’s self-reported mental health, 
 Parent’s self-reported discipline practices, 
 Child’s engagement in labor activities (as reported by the parent). 
The questionnaire administered to children will collect the following information: 
 Socio-demographic characteristics, such as gender and age, 
 Numeracy skills, measured through a test developed to assess children’s mathematics skills, 
which includes exercises from the PASEC (programme d'analyse des systèmes éducatifs de la 
Confemen), the EGMA (early grade mathematics assessment), and the IDELA (International 
Development & Early Learning Assesment), 
 Literacy skills, measured through a test developed to assess children’s French skills, based on 
EGRA (early grade reading assessment ) and Tulane University Survey of Child Cocoa Labour, 
 Visual working memory, measured through a simple picture-span task, 
 Visual attention, measured through a simple stroop task, 
 Child self-reported social-emotional skills, directly assessed through items used in IDELA, 
 Child self-reported impulsivity scale, 
 Child self-reported labor activities, which will be measured through the questionnaire. 
developed by Dr. Kaja Jasinska and has already been used in Côte d’Ivoire, 
 Child self-reported motivation, 
 Child self-reported self-esteem, 
 Child self-reported mindset (growth or fixed), 
 Parents’ involvement in child’s education as reported by the child, 
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 Child self-reported time use, 
 Teacher’s attendance as reported by the child. 
The questionnaire administered to teachers will collect the following data: 
 Socio-demographic characteristics, such as gender, age and closeness to the school, 
 Teacher language of instruction skills to assess their French reading comprehension skills, 
 Teacher trust in text messages, 
 Teacher self-reported education and training, 
 Teacher self-reported motivation, 
 Teacher self-reported attendance, 
 Teacher self-reported mindset (growth or fixed) and failure mindset, 
 Teacher self-reported job satisfaction. 
Finally, the questionnaire administered to head-teachers will collect the following data: 
 School characteristics such as meals provided at school and availability of classrooms, 
 Availability of teaching and learning materials, 



















We will document the effects of the treatments on the following outcomes categories for students 
enrolled in the second and fourth year of primary school (aged ~7 and ~9 years old respectively), the 
final grades of the first two primary school cycles1: 
1. Students’ school attendance, grade retention and drop-out rates measured by administrative records 
and/or by schools’ inputs at MGov’s platform;  
2. Students’ literacy and numeracy skills, measure through direct assessments;  
3. Students’ cognitive performance in tasks aimed at assessing working memory and attention: 
 Child visual attention, measured through a stroop-task; 
 Child visual working memory, measured through a picture span task. 
4. Students’ socio-emotional and self-regulatory skills: 
 Child self-reported social-emotional skills, directly assessed through items used in IDELA; 
 Child self-reported impulsivity scale. 
5. Additional students’ outcomes: 
 Child engagement in labor activities, as reported by the child and by the parent, measured 
through the questionnaire. developed by Dr. Kaja Jasinska and has already been used in 
Côte d’Ivoire, 
 Child self-reported motivation, 
 Child self-reported self-esteem, 
 Child self-reported mindset (growth or fixed), 
 Child self-reported time use. 
6. Parents’ outcomes: 
 Parent self-reported hypothetical willingness to pay to receive weekly messages about their 
child’s school life; 
 Parent’s involvement in their child’s education, as reported by the parent and the child, in 
terms of time spent for school-related activities 
 Parent self-reported mindset with respect to children (growth or fixed) and failure mindset, 
 Parent self-reported expectations, aspirations for their child’s education, and beliefs on the 
child’s school performance and attendance, 
                                                          
1 We focus on those grades such that we can estimate impacts on retention grades, since students cannot be failed 
on the first and third grades, the beginning of each of those cycles. 
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 Parent self-reported mental health, 
 Parent self-reported discipline practices, 
7. Teachers’ outcomes: 
 Teacher self-reported mindset and failure mindset; 
 Teacher self-reported motivation;  
 Teacher self-reported job satisfaction; 
 Teacher’s attendance (measure in three ways: (i) self-reported, (ii) reported by the students, 
and (iii) as reported by administrative records and/or by schools’ inputs at MGov’s 
platforms). 
Additionally, we will assess how students’, their parents and teachers‘ baseline characteristics moderate 
children’s response to the different versions of the program (audio and text), both in terms of outcomes 
measured by administrative records (grade retention and school attendance), but also their learning 
outcomes in both academic and behavioral domains.  
Since we have several outcome variables for each outcome categories, we will conduct a multiplicity of 
tests within each category. Estimating separate regressions for each outcome would substantially inflate 
the probability of false positives above stated significance levels. For this reason, we will build summary 
measures for each outcome category above, 1 through 7, Following Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007), we 
will normalize all outcomes to z-scores, and run seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) to compute effect 











VI. Empirical analysis 
1. Does Eduq+ Parents improve academic and behavioral learning outcomes? 
Comparing arm A to arms B+C will allow us to measure whether sending messages to parents is effective 
in improving students’ behavioral and learning outcomes. For each outcome j described above, we will 
estimate the following regressions indexed by school m, individual i and survey t: 
𝑌𝑚,𝑖,𝑡
𝑗




: Outcome variable; 
 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑚 : Dummy variable equal to 1 if parents in school m are assigned to receive the 
intervention (either text or audio), 0 otherwise. 
We are interested in testing 𝛽1 = 0. 
2. What delivery mode for Eduq+ has the largest impacts on academic and behavioural learning 
outcomes: audio or text? 
Comparing arm B to arm C will allow us to measure which delivery mode for Eduq+, audio or text, is 
more effective in improving students’ behavioral and learning outcomes.  For each outcome j described 
above, we will estimate the following regressions: 
𝑌𝑚,𝑖,𝑡
𝑗




: Outcome variable; 
 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑚: Dummy variable equal to 1 if parents in school m are assigned to receive the messages 
in the form of audio, 0 if the messages are received over SMS. 
 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑚: Dummy variable equal to 1 if parents in school m are assigned to receive the messages in 
the form of audio, 0 if the messages are received over SMS. 




3. Do text messages to teachers increase the impacts of audio/text messages to parents? 
In order to assess whether sending messages to teachers increases the impact of audio/text message to 
parents, we will estimate variants of the following regression for each outcome j described above in the 
groups ((1), (2), (3) and (4)): 
𝑌𝑚,𝑖,𝑡
𝑗




: Outcome variable; 
 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑚: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is assigned to receive the intervention; 0 
otherwise. 
 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑚 : Dummy variable equal to 1 if parents are assigned to receive the intervention (either 
text or audio), 0 otherwise. 
We are interested in testing 𝛽3 = 0. 
4. How do child and parents characteristics moderate impacts on (i) changes in parents’ education 
investments, and (ii) children’s learning outcomes? 
We will explore heterogeneity of treatment according to the following variables: 
 Baseline children’s literacy and numeracy skills; 
 Baseline children’s attention and working memory skills; 
 Baseline motivation (measured for children and teachers); 
 Baseline children’s social-emotional and self-regulatory skills; 
 Baseline children’s time use; 
 Baseline children’s self-esteem; 
 Baseline children’s, parents’ and teachers’ mindset (growth or fixed); 
 Gender of the child; 
 Baseline parents’ involvement in their child’s education; 
 Baseline parent’s aspiration and beliefs about their children’s school performance; 
 Baseline parent’s trust in audio vs visual messages; 
 Baseline parents’ attention and working memory 
 Baseline parents’ language skills; 
 Baseline teachers’ job satisfaction; 
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 Baseline teacher self-reported mindset and failure mindset; 
 Baseline teacher self-reported motivation;  
 Baseline school carachteristics. 
 
For each outcome j described above, we will estimate the following regressions: 
𝑌𝑚,𝑖,𝑡
𝑗
 = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑚 + ∑ 𝛽2
𝑗
(𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑚  x 𝑌𝑚,𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑗
)  + ∑ 𝛽3
𝑘(𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑚  x 𝑋𝑚,𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑘 ) + 𝛽4𝑌𝑚,𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑗
+




: Outcome variable; 
 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑚 : Dummy variable equal to 1 if parents are assigned to receive the intervention (either 
text or audio), 0 otherwise; 
 𝑌𝑚,𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑗
: Outcome variable at baseline; 
 𝑋𝑚,𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑘 : participants’ characteristic at baseline (as specified above) 
We are interested in applying machine learning techniques (such as random forests) to test 𝛽2
𝑗
= 0 and 
𝛽3
𝑘 = 0 trading-off goodness of fit against over-fitting. 
5. Do text messages to teachers improve teachers’ attendance and students’ learning outcomes? 
Comparing arm D to arm E will allow us to measure whether sending messages to teachers is more 
effective in increasing teachers’ attendance, and in improving students’ behavioral and learning outcomes.  
For each outcome j described above, we will estimate variants of the following regression: 
𝑌𝑚,𝑖,𝑡
𝑗




: Outcome variable; 
 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑚: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the teacher is assigned to receive the intervention; 0 
otherwise. 
We are interested in testing 𝛽1 = 0. 
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Are Parenting Interventions Transferable Across Settings? 
Evaluating Key Constraints in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Pre-analysis Plan – Extension for additional follow-up 
I. Introduction 
In this additional follow-up wave to the original study, we intend to survey once more all teachers and a 
subset of parents from participating schools. The survey instruments intend to help us understand the 
experimental findings. Mainly, we are interested in shedding light on the negative interaction effects: why 
is it that sending nudges to both parents and teachers ends up having no positive effects on educational 
outcomes, when sending nudges to parents only has very positive and significant effects?  To answer that 
question, this follow-up focuses on additional dimensions of parents behavior – in particular, whether 
they show up in school unannounced –, parents’ and teachers’ best response functions within the strategic 
problem of jointly producing children’s human capital, and their beliefs about the returns of this human 
capital production function to a variety of inputs.  
 
Beyond that main goal, we are also interested in collecting student-level data on grade repetition, dropouts 
and re-enrollment, since this data was only provided by the Government aggregated for each classroom. 
Last, we are also interested in better understanding the effects of the interventions on child labor more 
deeply, by eliciting more detailed measures of physical work in agriculture. 
 
The first step is to characterize planned inputs of each party (i.e. parents and teachers) in response to 
changes in inputs by the other party, as well as beliefs of each party, in terms of the distribution of 
expected returns (marginal and cross-derivatives) to different inputs by parents and teachers. The second 
step is to estimate treatment effects of the original interventions on additional measures of parents’ 
behaviors, on the distributions of those planned inputs and beliefs, and on those additional school 
outcomes and additional measures of child labor. As part of that effort, we also elicit incentivized 
measures of willingness to pay for the intervention under different treatment assignment of the other 
party, to gain a better understanding of interaction effects above and beyond self-reported non-
incentivized beliefs and actions. 
 
Those goals are summarized in the following research questions: 
 
1. What is parents’ and teachers’ effort conditional on different input levels of the other party? 
H3. PPre-analysis plan extension: extra follow-up wave
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 Hypothesis: Teacher effort changes non-monotonically with parents’ inputs: teachers plan 
to increase effort as a response to higher parental inputs starting from very low levels; 
however, for at least some inputs, planned effort decreases after inputs are high enough (e.g.: 
when too many parents show up in school too often).  
2. What are parents’ and teachers’ beliefs about the marginal and cross derivatives of students' 
learning to marginal increases in inputs by parents and teachers? 
 Hypothesis: Teachers believe that marginal returns to their inputs are low, and that at least 
some of parents' and teachers' inputs exhibit substitutability.  
3. Does the intervention decrease grade repetition and dropouts, and increase re-enrollment for the 
next school year? 
 Hypothesis: Nudges to parents decrease grade repetition and dropouts, and increase re-
enrollment. Nudges to teachers do not affect those outcomes, even when sent in 
combination with nudges to parents. 
4. Does the intervention decrease child labor in agriculture? 
 Hypothesis: Nudges to parents decrease the intensity of child labor in in agriculture, 
measured by the number of hours worked, the physicality of labor, the extent to which 
children handle dangerous tools, and the extent to which they sustain injuries, even though 
they increase the number of occasions in which children help parents in in agriculture. 
II. Intervention and experimental design 
There is no additional intervention at this stage. This follow-up wave of data collection, which we have 
designed and which will be implemented jointly with Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA), intends at 
capturing the additional research questions mentioned in the previous section.  
 
The survey will cover the same 100 schools that were surveyed in the first phase of the project in 2 
regions in Côte d’Ivoire. The sample of subjects for this follow-up consists of 296 randomly selected 
students' parents (1 per classroom) and all 296 teachers – 100 from CP2 teachers, 100 from CE2 and 96 
from CM2 – that took part in the study. The 200 CP2 and CE2 teachers have already been surveyed in 
the first phase, while the 96 CM2 teachers will be interviewed for the first time. Similarly, the parents 
consist of 100 parents whose child are CP2 students, 100 parents whose child are CE2 students and 96 
parents whose child are CM2 students. Similar to teachers, the 200 CP2 and CE2 students' parents have 
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already been surveyed in the first phase, while the 96 CM2 students' parents will be interviewed for the 
first time. To ensure maximum efficiency during field work, two replacements for each parent drawn to 
be surveyed will be randomly selected in case s/he is absent.  
 
A particular sample selection strategy will be applied to parents of CM2 students in control schools for 
which we have no information. In this case, the procedure that applied to select children whose parents 
are going to be interviewed is the following: once enumerators get to a school, they get the class list of 
CM2 students from last year. Using this class list and a random seed that corresponds to the size of the 
class and the day of the interview, the enumerator will randomly select one child whose parent will be 
contacted in order to organize the interview. Two substitutes will be selected in case the principal 
respondent is unreachable. 
 
For this follow-up wave, we will use primary data collected through surveys with parents and teachers. 
Specifically, data collection will occur through: (i) surveys with teachers administered in school, and (ii) 
directly administered surveys with parents in their home. This will occur during the month of November. 
III. Measures 
In this follow-up survey, we will collect information in four main categories of measures and outcomes: 
1. We want to understand and assess teachers' and parents’ best responses to the other party’s inputs, 
and their beliefs about returns of investments in children's education by each of them, in the case 
where both are targeted simultaneously by the program as well as in the case where each is targeted 
independently. 
In this category, the questionnaire administered to parents will collect the following data: 
 Parents’ effort best response function to teachers' inputs (taken as a given parameter). Parents 
are asked to report what they believe would have happened in terms of their effort in parenting 
for different frequencies at which teachers engage in various activities. Responses correspond to 
the magnitude of changes in baseline effort, and are reported on a scale from 1 to 5; 
 Parents’ views on binding constraints with respect to their child's education, such as teachers' 
limitation due to lack of parents’ education, teachers' limitation due to parents’ personal or 
financial problems, parents' limitation due to teachers’ absenteeism and parents' limitation due 
to teachers’ lack of training. These measures draw from and build up on the 2018 World 
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Development Report1. Parents need to indicate how much they agree/disagree with each 
statement, on a scale from 1 to 5; 
 Parents’ best guess of different dimensions of their child's school life such as grades, how often 
they show up in school, how often they help with homework, how often they apply corporal 
punishment, how often teachers are in the classroom teaching, how often teachers are able to 
answer their child's questions, how often teachers focus most of their time in the classroom on 
their child and how often teachers apply corporal punishment. Grades need to be reported on a  
0-10 scale (used in Côte d'Ivoire, rounded to the nearest 0.5); frequency is reported on a scale 
from 1 to 7; 
 Parents’ best guess of the impact of marginal changes in the aforementioned dimensions of their 
child’s school life on learning for math and French. Parents are asked to estimate what grades 
would be (0-10 scale) in each case; 
 Parents’ best guess of the impact of joint changes in their own and teachers’ inputs on learning 
for math and French. Parents are asked to estimate what grades would be (0-10 scale) in each 
case; 
 Parents’ best guess of the average impact of the program on their child's grades under different 
scenarios, such as whether messages are sent to parents only, to teachers only, or to both. 
Elicitation is incentivized with the possibility of winning airtime credit by selecting the correct 
bracket for average treatment effects (scale from 1 to 7). 
The questionnaire administered to teachers will collect the following data: 
 Teachers' effort best response function to parents' inputs (taken as a given parameter). Teachers 
are asked to report what they believe would have happened in terms of their effort in teaching 
for different frequencies at which parents engage in various activities. Responses correspond to 
the magnitude of changes in baseline effort, and are reported on a scale from 1 to 5; 
 Teachers’ views on binding constraints with respect to children's education, such as teachers' 
limitation due to parents’ lack of education, teachers' limitation due to parents’ personal or 
financial problems, parents' limitation due to teachers’ absenteeism and parents' limitation due 
to teachers’ lack of training. Teachers are asked to indicate how much they agree/disagree with 
each statement, on a scale from 1 to 5; 
 Teachers’ best guess of different dimensions of the typical student’s school life, such as grades, 
how often parents show up in school, how often parents help with homework, how often parents 
apply corporal punishment, how often they are in the classroom teaching, how often they are 
                                                          
1 World Bank. 2018. World Development Report 2018: Learning to Realize Education’s Promise. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-1096-1. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO 
5 
 
able to answer all questions asked in the classroom, how often they focus most of their time in 
the classroom students lagging behind and how often they apply corporal punishment. Grades 
need to be reported on a  0-10 scale (used in Côte d'Ivoire, rounded to the nearest 0.5); frequency 
is reported on a scale from 1 to 7; 
 Teachers’ best guess of the impact of marginal changes in the aforementioned dimensions of 
their child’s school life on learning for math and French. Teachers are asked to estimate what 
grades would be (0-10 scale) in each case; 
 Teachers’ best guess of the impact of joint changes in their own and parents’ inputs on learning 
for math and French. Teachers are asked to estimate what grades would be (0-10 scale) in each 
case; 
 Teachers’ best guess of the average impact of the program on grades of the typical student under 
different scenarios, such as whether messages are sent to parents only, to teachers only, or to 
both. Elicitation is incentivized with the possibility of winning airtime credit by selecting the 
correct answer. The scale of responses goes from 1 to 7; 
 Teachers’ views on optimal aggregate parental inputs. Teachers are asked to report the optimal 
frequency (from their perspective) at which different shares of parents should engage in different 
activities, such as showing up unannounced at school to ask for help interpreting an SMS or to 
inquire about what their child is learning. Teachers report how often each activity should take 
place (within a school year), for different shares of parents, on a scale from 1 to 5. 
2. We want to understand and assess the demand for the nudge program by parents and teachers. 
The questionnaire administered to parents will collect the following data: 
 Parents’ willingness to pay for receiving weekly messages about their child's school life through 
the use of Becker-DeGroot-Marshak (BDM) method, incentivized by the possibility of actually 
receiving messages or earning airtime credit. Amounts proposed range from 0 to 5000 CFA; 
 Parents’ hypothetical willingness to pay such that the teachers or other parents receive weekly 
messages about their child's school life under different scenarios, also through BDM, except that 
their decision has no probability of being actually implemented. Amounts proposed range from 
0 to 5000 CFA, 
The questionnaire administered to teachers will collect the following data: 
 Teachers’ willingness to pay for receiving weekly messages about their child's school life through 
BDM, incentivized by the possibility of actually receiving messages or earning airtime credit. 
Amounts proposed range from 0 to 5000 CFA; 
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 Teachers’ hypothetical willingness to pay such that they receive a different version of the 
program (based on a smartphone app) or such that parents receive weekly messages about their 
child's school life under different scenarios, also through BDM, except that their decision has no 
probability of being actually implemented. Amounts proposed range from 0 to 5000 CFA, 
3. We want to understand how the intervention impacts the extent to which parents show up in school 
unannounced, grade repetition, school dropouts, re-enrollment and child labor. 
The questionnaire administered to parents will collect the following data: 
 Parents’ self-report of the frequency at which they showed up to school unannounced to request 
help reading messages received in the context of the program, or to ask about any dimension of 
their child’s school life; 
 Parents’ self-report of  whether their child dropped out of school, repeated the grade, and re-
enrolled; 
 Parents’ best guess of their child’s engagement in different labor activities. For some of the 
questions, parents are asked to estimate the time spent working by their child, on a scale from 1 
to 6. For one question, parents are asked when the child works, on a scale from 1 to 8. For the 
remaining questions, they are asked whether the child is involved or not in different labor 
activities (yes or no).  
The questionnaire administered to teachers will collect the following data: 
 Teachers’ best guess of which students dropped out of school, repeated the grade, and re-
enrolled. This tries to approximate child-level administrative data measured, as teachers are asked 
to tick the names corresponding to each question in their class list; 
 Teachers' best guess of which students had their parents request help reading messages received 
in the context of the program. This tries to approximate child-level administrative data measured, 
as teachers are asked to tick the names corresponding to each question in their class list; 
 Teachers' best guess of students’ engagement in different labor activities. Some of those 
questions try to approximate child-level administrative data measured, as teachers are asked to 
tick the names corresponding to each question in their class list (only for the subset of students 
who have already been surveyed in previous waves). Teachers are also asked to estimate the time 
spent working by the typical child, on a scale from 1 to 6. For one question, teachers will be 




4. We want to understand teachers' willingness to invest in their own professional development and in 
children's education. 
The questionnaire administered to teachers will collect the following data: 
 Teachers' self-reported professional aspirations, measured on a scale from 1 to 5 corresponding 
to different career options they can select; 
 Teachers' self-reported willingness to spend time on their own professional development, 
measured on a scale from 1 to 7. 
IV. Empirical analysis 
Our empirical analysis will consist in two main steps, as discussed previously: a descriptive step, and an 
impact evaluation step. Both steps are explained in detail below. 
A. Descriptive 
1. Estimating each party’s best response function to the other party’s inputs, and their beliefs about 
how returns to investment in children's education vary with inputs of both teachers and parents, has 
the potential to shed light on whether substitutability is behind negative interaction effects of the 
intervention. We will also characterize how well parents and teachers accurately anticipate average 
treatment effects, to gain further understanding about whether their beliefs and best response 
functions have the potential to provide a rational explanation to observed treatment effects. To 
complement that descriptive evidence on beliefs and strategic responses, we are interested on parents' 
and teachers' more general perceptions about complementarity between their inputs. 
 
In the equation below, we are interested in 𝛽1 > 0 (complementarity) or 𝛽1 < 0 (substitutability). 
We also include a quadratic term to allow for potential non-monotonicity (𝛽2 and 𝛽1 with different 
signs): 
𝑌𝑐𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑐𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑐𝑗
2 + 𝜀𝑐𝑘                    (1) 
Where: 
 𝑌𝑐𝑘 : outcome variable for the student (parent k’s child or the typical student within 




  𝑋𝑐𝑗 : Vector of inputs (potentially singleton) by subjects j (either k, -k or both) in 
classroom c. 
Importantly, because we only elicit perceived returns relative to local perturbations – i.e. given each 
party’s best guess of the outcome for the (typical) student –, different parts of the distribution are 
estimated using different sub-samples. 
2. Estimating the relationship between teachers' satisfaction and the share of parents engaged in 
different monitoring activities will give us insights into potential non-monotonicity of monitoring 
that does not necessarily emerge out of rational strategic responses to changes in inputs.  
 
In the equation below, we are interested in 𝛽1 > 0 (complementarity) or 𝛽1 < 0 (substitutability). 
We also include a quadratic term to allow for potential non-monotonicity (𝛽2 and 𝛽1 with different 
signs): 
𝑌𝑐 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑐 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑐
2 + 𝜀𝑐                      (2) 
Where: 
 𝑌𝑐 : teacher in classroom c’s self-reported satisfaction; 
  𝑆𝑐 : share of parents of children in classroom c engaged in a particular activity. 
 
3. Estimating the accuracy of parents’ and teachers’ prediction of average effects of the program under 
different scenarios will help potentially rationalize treatment effects with their beliefs and best 
response functions. We will mainly focus on descriptive statistics, among teachers and parents, of 
both their beliefs and the distance between those beliefs and the correct answer.  
4. Estimating teachers' and parents' willingness to pay will help us understand how much they value the 
program. Once again, we will focus on summary statistics, among teachers and parents. We are also 
interested on how WTP changes with the share of parents engaging on different activities, following 
equation 2. 
5. Estimating teachers' career aspirations will help us understand how much effort they are willing to 
invest in improving themselves as teachers, which will ultimately impact their quality in the classroom. 





B. Impact evaluation 
We will document the effects of treatment assignment on the following outcomes categories for students 
enrolled in the second, fourth and sixth year of primary school (CP2, CE2 and CM2), the final grades of 
the first three primary school cycles: 
1. Students dropout rate, grade repetition rate and re-enrollment rate, according to both teachers and 
parents; 
2. Different measures of child labor, according to both parent and the teacher. To deal with family-wise 
error rates for related hypotheses testing, we will create a summary measure (Kling, Liebman and 
Katz, 2007) of child labor for each respondent. 
3. Parents' outcomes: 
 Self-reported frequency at which parents show up in school unannounced; 
 Parents' willingness to pay for receiving weekly messages about their child's school life; 
 Parents' hypothetical willingness to pay for having teachers receiving the program and for having 
other parents receiving weekly messages about their child's school life; 
 Parents' prediction accuracy of the average impact of the program on their child's grades. 
4. Teachers' outcomes: 
 Teachers' willingness to pay for receiving weekly messages designed to them; 
 Teachers' hypothetical willingness to pay for receiving the smartphone-based program and for 
having parents receiving weekly messages about their child's school life; 
 Teachers' prediction accuracy of the average impact of the program on the typical student; 
 Teachers' self-reported professional aspirations. To deal with family-wise error rates for related 
hypotheses testing, we will create a summary measure (Kling, Liebman and Katz, 2007) 
Following the main pre-analysis plan, we will study those questions through the following regressions, 
separately for different grades: 
𝑌𝑠𝑐𝑖  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑠x 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠𝑐𝑖                    (3) 
Where: 
 𝑌𝑠𝑐𝑖 : Outcome variable for child i in classroom c at school s;  
 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑠 : Indicator variable equal to 1 if parents in school s are assigned to receive the 
intervention, and 0 otherwise; 
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 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠: Indicator variable equal to 1 if teachers in school s are assigned to receive the 
intervention, and 0 otherwise; 
We are interested in testing 𝛽1 = 0, 𝛽2 = 0 and  𝛽3 = 0.  
Additionally, we will assess how parents’ and teachers’ estimates of different dimensions of children can 
moderate children's response to the program. These dimensions are how often parents show up in school, 
how often parents help with homework, how often parents apply corporal punishment, how often 
teachers are in the classroom teaching, how often teachers are able to answer questions asked in the 
classroom, how often teachers focus most of their time in the classroom on specific students and how 
often teachers apply corporal punishment. We will also assess how parents' and teachers' views on binding 
constraints can moderate children's response to the program. 
For the moderation analysis, we will estimate: 
𝑌𝑠𝑐𝑖  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑠𝑖 +  𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠x 𝑋𝑠𝑐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑠𝑐𝑖                                   (4) 
Where: 
 𝑌𝑠𝑐𝑖 : Outcome variable for child i in classroom c at school s;  
 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠: Indicator variable equal to 1 if teachers/parents/both parties in school s are 
assigned to receive the intervention, and 0 otherwise; 
 𝑋𝑠𝑐𝑖 : Vector of covariate (candidates for moderation) for children i in classroom c at school s. 
 
